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PREFACE
While researching this thesis, I drove to Richmond, 
Virginia to examine documents at Virginia Commonwealth 
University. Just as I exited the highway in downtown 
8Richmond, my car broke down. I ended up sitting on a 
street corner waiting for a tow truck as an elderly 
gentleman wearing a red bandanna and not much else tugged on 
a cigarette while preaching about sin and temptation to no 
one in particular.
This experience helped me recognize that my work up to 
that point lacked a complete understanding of how the 
automobile became the dominate means of transportation 
during the twentieth century. Getting stranded in Richmond 
also convinced me that I had to explore the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. This was a period, unlike my 
own, when locomotives dominated and automotive 
transportation was still in its infancy. The railroads' 
reign, however, did not last. I argue that during the 
1950s, the Eisenhower administration neglected mass transit 
and ignored railroad objections while promoting highways as 
the solution to the nation's transportation problems. The 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 initiated construction on
iv
the interstate highway system, which played a key role in
creating a society dependent on the automobile.
So as I sat on that street corner in Richmond, I 
realized that I had fallen victim to America's dependency on 
the automobile as I tried to uncover the root causes of that 
reliance. Had I considered taking a bus or train from 
Williamsburg to Richmond? Did either means of public 
transportation run routes that would have been convenient 
for me? The answers to these two questions were no and I 
have no idea. My first (and only) thought was to get in the 
car and head up Route 64, which, incidently, was built as 
part of the interstate highway system.
My goal became to explore how the automobile 
effectively replaced the locomotive as the nation's primary 
means of transportation. Answering this question entailed 
looking at how the relationship between business and 
government evolved during the first half of the twentieth 
century. I found that throughout this period, many railroad 
companies welcomed government efforts to regulate their 
industry. The federal government was also quite willing to 
protect the interests of businesses deemed essential to 
American economic prosperity. During the early twentieth 
century, the railroads were just such an industry.
The Progressive Era established a relationship between 
transportation interests and government that remained in 
place during the following decades. This relationship
v
changed, however, as other methods of transportation 
developed.
Railroad regulation had stabilized the industry, but it 
also made the railroads unresponsive to competition from 
other modes of transportation. By the 1950s, the railroads 
were in decline as trucks and automobiles took away larger 
and larger portions of their freight-hauling and passenger 
customers. These industries, along with tire and oil 
companies, jelled into a powerful lobby that demanded 
government support for a new, federally-funded interstate 
highway system to serve intracity as well as intercity 
transportation needs. The railroads opposed this plan 
because they understood that a new highway system would 
enhance truckers' ability to make deliveries quicker and 
cheaper, thus allowing the trucking industry to take even 
more business away.
But the "highway lobby" managed to overcome railroad 
opposition to the interstate system as well as opposition 
from urban planners and other highway critics who advocated 
mass transit solutions to urban transportation problems.
The federal government had deserted the railroads for the 
trucking, automobile, tire, and petroleum industries because 
these interests represented the American economy's future. 
This shift in governmental attention helped produce the 
Federal Highway Act of 1956, the interstate highway system,
vi
and a society dependent on automotive transportation.
vii
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ABSTRACT
Over the past forty years, the automobile has become 
the means of transportation that Americans rely on most. The 
1956 decision to build the interstate highway system played 
a key role in creating this dependency. Explaining why the 
Eisenhower Administration and Congress supported the 
interstate system's construction reguires looking first at 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period 
when railroads dominated and automotive transportation was 
still in its infancy.
During the late nineteenth century, farmers living on 
the newly-settled Great Plains found themselves dependent 
upon bankers and railroad companies. Mid-western farmers 
turned to the federal government for assistance in creating 
equitable business relationships with the nation's 
railroads. Most railroads, however, sought to turn reform 
efforts in their favor by supporting regulation that 
eliminated the competition that had made the railroad 
industry so unstable during the late nineteenth century. 
Realizing that the railroads were essential to future 
economic security and prosperity, the federal government 
generally supported railroad efforts to establish regulatory 
law that helped stabilize the industry while significantly 
increasing profits.
The Progressive Era established a relationship between 
transportation interests and government that remained in 
place during the ensuing decades. This relationship changed, 
however, as other methods of transportation developed. By 
the 1950s, the railroads were in decline, behind the surging 
trucking and automobile industries. These industries joined 
forces with powerful oil and tire companies to form a 
powerful lobby that demanded and received government support 
for extensive highway construction at the railroads' 
expense. The federal government was still willing to protect 
and promote the interests of big business, but truckers and 
automobiles had replaced the railroads as the most important 
providers of transportation. With these industries leading 
the way, Congress approved the construction of the 
interstate highway system, which, in turn, helped produce a 
society dependent on automobile transportation.
ix
TRAINS, TRUCKS, AND TRAFFIC JAMS:
THE RISE OF AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION/ 1880-1956
INTRODUCTION
Over the past forty years the automobile has become the 
means of transportation that Americans rely on most. The 
motorcar's dominance becomes evident when one turns on a 
television or opens a newspaper. The glut of automobile 
advertisements threatens, at times, to overtake the airwaves 
and the pages of print publications. Another glut, the one 
on the nation's highways, further illustrates America's 
reliance on the car. Major traffic jams have become a 
common experience for residents of the country's major 
cities.
The car's preponderance has raised other concerns and 
difficulties. Smog and acid rain caused, in part, by 
automobile exhaust have become persistent problems. The 
automobile's primacy and the resultant demand for foreign 
petroleum has also weakened America's position in 
international politics. The 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 
Persian Gulf War demonstrated American susceptibility to 
economic warfare and the need to protect petroleum produced 
overseas.1
!John B. Rae's pioneering work on automotive history, 
The American Automobile (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1965) and The Road and the Car in American Life
2
3These problems raise questions about how the United 
States came to depend on automotive transit. This 
dependency cannot be dismissed as simply the result of 
America's well-known love affair with the automobile, 
although the reasons why Americans fell in love with their 
cars is a fascinating topic in itself. Automobile 
manufacturers often advertised their products in ways that 
appealed to middle-class sensibilities that emerged during 
the first half of the twentieth century. What could be more 
modern, or more masculine, than owning a machine? Cars also 
became powerful symbols of economic and social status that 
pulled middle- and upper-class Americans out of the train 
station's and passenger compartment's public space and into 
the personal, private space of the automobile. This new 
private space separated more affluent white Americans from 
the black and immigrant inner city dwellers who continued to 
ride public transportation. The automobile's privacy also
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1971) sees the automobile and the expanded 
highway network as an egalitarian phenomena that enabled the 
burgeoning middle-class to escape the pressures of city 
life. For a more critical appraisal of the automobile, see 
James J. FIink, The Car Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1975 and The 
Automobile Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 1988). Daniel Yergin's, The 
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1991) examines the international 
consequences of America's increasing dependency on foreign 
oil during the twentieth century while James A. Bill's The 
Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of Iranian-American 
Relations (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1988) explores American efforts to assure its control of 
Iranian oil and the consequences of these efforts.
4provided a new location for sexual expression that 
significantly changed courtship rituals among young people.
But exploring these aspects of the automobile's ascent 
will have to wait because a full understanding of the 
automobile's success cannot be achieved with exploring the 
relationship between business and government during the 
twentieth century's first half. During this time period, 
the federal government's transportation policies concerning 
highways and railroads evolved to create a business 
environment that favored automotive transportation.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1956 plan to build the 
interstate highway system represented a major shift in 
American transportation policy because the federal 
government would pay approximately 9 0 percent of the new 
interstate system's construction costs. The trucking 
industry led the tire, petroleum, and automobile industries 
in fighting for congressional approval of the interstate 
highway bill. Truckers saw the advantage a new, federally- 
funded highway system would give their industry and pounced 
on the opportunity to exploit the Eisenhower 
administration's highway proposal.2
2The most important works on the interstate highway 
system are Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway 
Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville, Tennessee: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990) and Bruce E. Seely, Building the 
American Highway System: Engineers as Policymakers 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). Rose and 
Seely provide an intense analysis of the legislative process 
the created the Federal Highway Act of 195 6. Richard 0.
Railroad owners, however, opposed a federally 
subsidized interstate highway system. For almost thirty 
years, truckers had succeeded in taking business away from 
the railroads and by the 1950s, they presented a major 
threat to the railroads' future prosperity. Railroad owners 
promoted the idea that their inability to compete with 
truckers originated in the federal government's late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century efforts to regulate 
the railroad industry. Railroad leaders argued that the 
trucking industry encountered less government interference, 
which tilted the field of competition in the truckers' 
favor.3
But an examination of the relationship between the 
railroad industry and government during the Progressive Era 
tells a different story. In fact, many railroad owners and
Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and 
the Condition of Metropolitan America (Philadelphia: J. B. 
Lippincott and Company, 1975) examines the more recent 
consequences of the highways' and automobiles' 
proliferation. Published immediately after the Arab oil 
embargo of 1973, The Age of Asphalt criticizes the 
shortsightedness of creating a one-dimensional 
transportation system dependent on an unlimited supply of 
cheap, foreign oil. Less successful, but still useful 
sources are A. Q. Mowbray's Road to Ruin (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, Inc., 19 69) and Helen Leavitt, Superhighway-
Superhoax (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
1970).
3Albro Martin, Railroads Triumphant: The Growth, 
Rejection, and Rebirth of a Vital American Force (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 361-72; George Hilton, The 
Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of Experience 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1969), 10- 
15.
6public officials supported government regulation as a way of 
stabilizing the industry.
During the 1880s and 1890s, the railroad industry 
conducted business in an unstable and ferociously 
competitive environment. The industry's instability led to 
inefficient business practices that spawned bankrupt lines. 
The railroad industry also faced criticism from reformers 
who sought to challenge monopolistic business practices 
through government action. As the call for regulation 
became louder and louder, railroad leaders sought a method 
for using reform sentiment to their advantage. If popular 
opinion demanded regulation, then the railroads would 
exploit that sentiment to end destructive rivalries and 
restore order, stability, and most of all, profits.
Early twentieth-century progressives demanded 
regulation, but for different reasons. The Second 
Industrial Revolution spawned large railroad companies and 
the highly competitive conditions within this industry. 
Industrial capitalism also plugged farmers on the newly- 
settled Great Plains into the world market economy. These 
farmers found themselves dealing with and dependent upon 
bankers and railroads companies that often took advantage of 
them. The inability to acquire credit on reasonable terms 
and the unreasonable fees railroads charged for shipping 
grain and produce to market led to the Populist Revolt of 
the 1890s and the rural reform politics of the Progressive
Era. Mid-Western farmers and other shippers turned to their 
state representatives and the federal government for 
assistance in establishing equitable business relationships 
with the nations' railroads.4
Progressives, many of whom held public office, wanted 
to reform large corporate monopolies because these 
monopolies limited economic opportunity and created a big 
business-dominated political system. Correcting these 
inequities would require government supervision of large 
corporations to ensure that all Americans could enjoy the 
highest degree of political, economic, and social freedom. 
Hence, support for regulation existed within the railroad 
industry and the progressive movement. Progressive 
animosity toward the railroads, therefore, did not mean that 
railroad owners attempted to block all efforts to regulate 
their industry.5
4See Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: Bryan to 
F. D. R . (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), Lee Benson, 
Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and 
New York Politics, 1850-1887 (New York: Russell and Russell, 
1955), Richard Hofstadter, ed., The Progressive Movement, 
1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), introduction, and Morton Keller, Regulating a 
New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 
1900-1913 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1990) for discussions of farmers' involvement in the 
progressive movement.
5Some of the most important studies of the American 
Progressive movement and its efforts to regulate industry 
are Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A 
Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York: 
Free Press, 19 63); Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: Bryan to 
F. D . R; Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of
8Over a twenty-year period covering the administrations 
of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow 
Wilson, the federal government implemented regulation that 
created a stable, successful, and almost competition-free 
railroad industry.6 But the federal government enacted 
these regulations when the railroads possessed a virtual 
monopoly over American transportation. Regulation 
supporters did not recognize the harm these controls might 
cause when other transportation systems developed the 
ability to compete with the mighty locomotive. By the 
1950s, the railroads were losing a significant portion of
the American Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 19 62); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search 
for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Lewis 
L. Gould, ed., The Progressive Era (Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1974). For an overview of the 
Progressive Era, see Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at 
Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919 (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1987) . For more recent interpretations, 
see Andrew Feffer, The Chicago Pragmatists and American 
Progressivism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1993) ; William A. Link, The Paradox of Southern 
Progressivism (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1992); Robert David Johnson, The Peace 
Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Morton Keller, 
Regulating A New Economy: Policy and Social Change in 
America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1994).
6Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 provides an 
excellent analysis of government action to implement 
regulation during this time period. Also see Wiebe, Business 
and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement, Wiebe, The 
Search for Order, 1877-1920, Theodore E. Keeler, Railroads, 
Freight, and Public Policy (Washington, D .C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1983), chapters 2-4; Albro Martin, Enterprise 
Denied: The Origins of the Decline of American Railroads, 
1897-1917 ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
9their business to the trucking industry and a new, 
federally-funded interstate highway system would only 
enhance the trucker's ability to take business away from the 
railroads.7
During the congressional debate over the interstate 
highway system, the railroad industry found that it no 
longer could dictate federal transportation policy.
Railroads were the nineteenth century's mode of 
transportation. The automobile and the truck (along with 
the airplane), however, dominated the twentieth century. As 
a result, the railroads along with those who advocated mass 
transit alternatives for providing urban transportation and 
questioned the highway's ability to help evacuate cities in 
case of nuclear attack lost their campaign against the 
interstate highway system. Although the decision to build 
the interstate highway system contained some questionable 
reasoning on the Eisenhower administration's part, the 
trucking, automotive, oil, and tire industries convinced the 
administration and Congress that massive highway 
construction was absolutely necessary for the country's 
future economic prosperity and military defense. Hence, the 
federal government had a consistent policy of promoting 
transportation and business interests deemed essential to 
economic prosperity. Government officials obliged
7Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of 
Experience, 10-15.
10
transportation and business interests in the 195 0s just as 
they had during the century's first two decades when 
enacting railroad regulation. By 1956, however, the 
businesses that attracted the government's attention had 
changed.
CHAPTER 1
The Railroads, Progressivism, and Regulation
Over the past thirty years, historians have modified 
their views of efforts to regulate the railroad industry.
The traditional position asserted that the railroads opposed 
federal control. In recent years, revisionists have 
questioned this argument. They suggest that government 
regulation was, in part, intended to stabilize the industry 
after its near collapse in the 1880s and early 1890s. 
Revisionists also maintain that railroad owners and 
executives generally favored federal efforts to obtain some 
control over their industry.1
Confrontational and antagonistic best describe the 
traditional view of government-railroad relations in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. See I. L. 
Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 5 vols. (New 
York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931-1937) I; Albro Martin, 
Enterprise Denied: The Origins of the Decline of American 
Railroads, 1897-1917 ( New York: Columbia University Press,
1971); Albro Martin, Railroads Triumphant: The Growth, 
Rejection, and Rebirth of a Vital American Force (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). For an alternative view, see 
Paul W. MacAvoy, The Economic Effects of Regulation: The 
Trunk-Line Railroad Cartels and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission before 1900 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965) and 
Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), 
especially chapters 1 and 2. For a refutation of Kolko, see 
Robert W. Harbeson, "Railroads and Regulation: Conspiracy or 
Public Interest?" in Robert F. Himmelberg, ed., Growth of 
the Regulatory State, 1990-1917: State Federal Regulation of
11
12
The railroads' incredible growth during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century coupled with the surge in 
speculation and instability within the industry help explain 
the railroads' endorsement of government regulation. The 
Industrial Revolution, which provided the capability to 
build railways, also fostered their development. As the 
American economy expanded during the nineteenth century, the 
demand for improved transportation also increased. The 
expanding nineteenth-century economy made every segment of 
society— from farmers who wanted their produce delivered 
quickly and cheaply to businessmen who wanted their 
factories' goods shipped to market or to either coast for 
shipment overseas— grew dependent on locomotive 
transportation. Accordingly, railways became indispensable 
to American economic prosperity.2
Despite the essential nature of their existence, the 
railroads experienced a variety of problems. Railroad 
construction soared during the 187 0s and 1880s. Speculators 
purposely built new lines parallel to existing lines because
Railroads and Other Enterprises, vol. 3 of Business and 
Government in America Since 1870 (New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1994), 128-141.
2See Alfred D. Chandler, ed. Railroads: The Nation's 
First Big Business (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 
19 65) and Robert W. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic 
Growth: Essays in Econometric History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1964). Chandler's work stresses 
the importance of the railroads to nineteenth-century 
economic growth while Fogel's book questions that 
importance.
13
they knew the original lines' owners would buy the new ones 
for an inflated price in order to limit competition. 
Nevertheless, railways and rail companies multiplied 
rapidly, causing fierce rivalries between companies.
Special rates, free passes for large shippers, low rates on 
bulk freight, and rebates— secretly negotiated reductions 
below published prices— became commonplace. Intense 
rivalries also caused bankruptcy and mergers that fostered 
inefficiency. As a result, the railroads failed to maintain 
their success. The panic of 1893 and the ensuing depression 
could not have come at a worse time. Many more rail lines 
went bankrupt, and those that survived teetered on the brink 
of extinction.3
These remaining companies sought the assistance of 
several prominent investment bankers. J. Pierpont Morgan's 
New York-based banking house lent a substantial amount of 
money to railroad owners. In return, the railroads 
acquiesced to Morgan's vision of the industry's future 
configuration. J. P. Morgan despised competition. He 
arranged a traffic-sharing agreement among the remaining 
railroad companies and collected a $1 million fee for doing 
so. Morgan also eliminated rebates and other industry
3MacAvoy, The Economic Effects of Regulation and Kolko, 
Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916, chapters one and two.
14
features that fostered competition.4
The railroad industry, however, remained relatively 
competitive throughout the 1890s. The 1893 Depression 
stimulated rate wars, as railways struggled desperately to 
remain afloat in an ever-shrinking market. In 1887, there 
were twenty-eight railroads with over a thousand miles of 
track. By 1900, forty-eight systems eclipsed the thousand- 
mile mark. A significant number of these lines remained 
independent of Morgan and managed to compete among 
themselves and with the railways that constituted J. P. 
Morgan's dynasty.5
Like Morgan, many railroad owners wanted to eliminate 
even this lingering competition. They turned to the 
government as a two-fold solution that would stifle 
competition while solving the industry's persistent 
financial problems. The continuous decline in shipping 
charges led railroad owners to consider using the federal 
government to stabilize rates after pools— voluntary rate 
and market share agreements between several lines— failed to 
produce positive results. Such agreements' major
4Vincent P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International 
Bankers, 1854-1913 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), chapter ten discusses Morgan's 
involvement in the railroad industry.
5United States Industrial Commission, Report of the 
Industrial Commission on Transportation (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1900), IV, 296-298; U. S. Bureau 
of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1960), 429.
15
shortcoming was that, in an industry as cut-throat as 
railroading, one company or another would inevitably violate 
a voluntary rate arrangement.6 The federal government's 
involvement in setting and enforcing rates would provide 
industry stability while working to reduce competition.
These solutions, however, conflicted with laissez-faire 
capitalism and free enterprise, two ideas that American 
businesses often supported. Moreover, business leaders like 
Andrew Carnegie connected the doctrine of Social Darwinism 
to the business world. Social Darwinism— philosopher 
Herbert Spencer's application of Charles Darwin's theory of 
evolution to social relations— argued that unrestrained 
competition was simply natural selection's way of weeding 
out unfit businesses. Railroad owners, however, abandoned 
laissez-faire capitalism and Social Darwinism when their 
companies faced bankruptcy. Most railroad men were not 
interested in the intellectual significance of allowing 
government regulation; most were more concerned with solving 
immediate economic problems in the quickest manner 
possible.7
6Martin, Enterprise Denied: The Origins of the Decline 
of American Railroads, 1897-1917, 36-37 describes pooling 
arrangements and why they failed.
7See Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth and Other 
Timely Essays, edited by Edward C. Kirkland (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 19 62). On Social 
Darwinism, see Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in 
American Thought, 1860-1915 (New York: George Braziller,
Inc., 1959); Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The 
Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought
16
The progressive movement, of course, concerned itself 
with a variety of issues. Turn-of-the-century reformers 
addressed social and cultural as well as economic and 
political problems. Progressivism also had different 
meanings in different regions of the country. For instance, 
rural progressives sought to rectify the injustices 
inflicted on farmers during the late nineteenth century. 
These farmers fed America's expanding work force and 
generated the foreign capital needed to finance 
industrialization, but they had not enjoyed the economic 
prosperity their toil had helped create. Farmers had little 
protection from railroad exploitation, the high cost of 
credit, and the burden of taxation. The grievances that 
kindled the Populist uprising of the 1890s had not been 
forgotten, and farmers saw the progressive movement of as a 
way of addressing these issues. At the same time, the urban 
areas that expanded with American industry were also centers 
of poverty, decay, and corruption. According to many 
reformers, these problems stemmed from America's rapid 
industrialization, the influx of immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe, and the resulting decline in national 
morality. When critiquing industrialization, both rural and 
urban progressives expressed hostility toward the large
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Robert C. 
Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo- 
American Social Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1979).
17
corporations that industrial capitalism had created.8
These criticisms, however, did not mean that railroad 
owners automatically became progressivism's adversary. Not 
all railroad leaders supported government initiatives to 
regulate their businesses and those who did could not always 
agree on the form that regulation should take. Railroads 
differed in many respects including their size, location, 
and specialization in passenger travel or hauling freight. 
These characteristics helped determine the various 
railroads' stance on regulation and differences between 
railroads often created disagreement. Nevertheless, most 
railroad owners never wavered from the principle that 
regulation was a positive step for their industry. Railroad 
owners simply had different reasons for wanting to obtain
8Many studies discuss the various reform efforts of the 
Progressive Era. For an overview of social reform, see 
Morton Keller, Regulating a New Society: Public Policy and 
Social Change in America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994). On the 
plight of immigrants, see Jacob A. Riis, How the Other Half 
Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York (New York: 
Dove Publications, 1971, 1890). On progressivism's affects 
on American diplomacy, see Robert David Johnson, The Peace 
Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995). On women's 
suffrage, see Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern 
Feminism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1987). On political reform efforts, see Robert M. Crunden, 
Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievements in 
American Civilization (New York: Basic Books, 1982). On the 
muckrakers, see Harold S. Wilson, McClure's Magazine and the 
Muckrakers (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1970). On the labor movement, see Harold Livesay, 
Samuel Gompers and Organized Labor in America Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1978).
18
the same objectives as progressives.9
The late nineteenth century unleashed intense public 
hostility toward large corporations, or trusts. This 
animosity spurred Congress to take action and, in 1887, the 
legislature passed the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). The 
measure prohibited discrimination against shippers and 
localities, made charging more for a shorter haul than for a 
longer haul illegal, outlawed pools, and dictated the 
publication of all shipping fees. The new law also created 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to oversee railroad 
activity.10
Sentiment among railroad owners toward the Interstate 
Commerce Act was mixed. Many did not approve of short-long 
haul clause while others disagreed with the clause against 
pooling because they believed that such agreements helped 
maintain stable shipping rates. The railroads, however, 
only had to live with the short-long haul clause until 1897. 
In that year, the Supreme* Court overturned the prohibitions 
against long-short haul discrimination.11
9Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916, 
introduction; Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A 
Study of the American Progressive Movement (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), 212-219.
10,1 An Act To Regulate Commerce" (No Public Law Number, 
February 4, 1887) 24 United States Statues at Large, 379-
387.
nI. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 5 
vols. (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931-1937), I, 24;
Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation (New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 192 8); Robert H.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission also frightened some 
railroad men. The ICA contained several vague passages, 
which the Commission would have to clarify. Therefore, 
railroad owners expressed concern over President Grover 
Cleveland planned appointees to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.12
Cleveland's choice of Thomas M. Cooley as the new 
commission's chairman eased the railroad owners' anxiety. A 
lawyer, Cooley had made his reputation as a theorist of 
government action's constitutional limitations.
Furthermore, he had worked as a railroad administrator and 
knew the challenges that the industry faced as it headed 
toward a new century. Cooley's opinions and actions did not 
always support the railroads' position, but his tenure as 
chair set the stage for the relatively amenable relationship 
that developed between the railroads and the ICC over the 
ensuing two decades.13
As calls for reform became louder, Congress passed more 
railroad regulation. Three times during the new century's
Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1967), 53; Ari and Olive Hoogenboom, A History of the 
ICC: From Panacea to Palliative (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1976), 21-23.
12Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916, 46-48.
13Thomas McIntyre Cooley, A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative 
Power of the States of the American Union (New York: De Capo 
Press, 1868); Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916, 
47-48.
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first decade, Congress increased regulation, but, contrary 
to popular opinion at the time, President Theodofe Roosevelt 
was not an avid regulation supporter.14 In his first 
message to Congress, TR acknowledged that "the great 
corporations known as trusts are in certain features and 
tendencies hurtful to the general welfare." "It is true," 
he continued, that these corporations perpetrated "real and 
grave evils . . . and a resolute and practical effort must
be made to correct these evils." Nevertheless, Roosevelt 
believed that Congress had to act cautiously when 
implementing regulation because "the captains of industry 
who have driven the railroad system across this continent 
have on the whole done great good to our people. Without 
them the material development of which we are so proud could 
never have taken place." A cautious approach was also 
necessary because "it cannot too often be pointed out that 
to strike with ignorant violence at the interests of one set 
of men almost inevitably endangers the interests of all."15 
Roosevelt agreed that trusts hurt small businesses and 
limited individual opportunity, but he also believed that 
large corporations generated essential production and
14Richard Hofstadter, ed., The Progressive Movement, 
1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), 11-12; Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of
Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas 
Press, 1991), 156.
15Quotations from Messages and Papers of the President, 
1789-1904, James Richardson, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau 
of National Literature and Art, 1905) 10, 422-423.
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industrial growth that helped secure the country's future 
economic success.
The reform efforts of the early twentieth century, 
however, compelled Roosevelt to seek government regulation 
of the railroads. Progressivism's popularity in the Mid- 
and Far West and the support federal action received from 
reform governors like Robert M. "Fighting Bob" La Follette 
of Wisconsin and Hiram Johnson of California also influenced 
Roosevelt's stand on regulation.16
In 1906, La Follette made an impassioned, pro­
regulation speech before the U. S. Senate. He had just won 
election to a Senate seat and arrived in Washington as 
Congress began debating a piece of regulatory legislation 
that eventually became the Hepburn Act. La Follette 
contended, "The farmer knows that there is no open, free 
competitive market for anything he may produce. He knows he 
must accept the prices fixed by the beef trust and the 
elevator combination. He knows that both of these 
organizations have been given control of the markets by the 
railroads." Monopolies, La Follette continued, created 
injustice because people were forced to use the railroads to 
"market the products of his capital and his labor . . .  on 
the terms fixed by the railway corporation. Or to say it
16See David P. Thelen, Robert La Follette and the 
Insurgent Spirit (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 197 6) 
and George E. Mowry, The California Progressives, (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1951) for 
discussions of La Follette and Johnson.
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arrogantly and brutally, as did the president of the 
Louisville and Nashville Railway Company in his testimony 
before the ICC, that the public can pay the charge which the 
railroad demands, 'or it can walk.'" La Follette believed 
regulation legislation was extremely important because "the 
subject with which it deals goes to the very heart of the 
whole question. Out of railroad combination with monopoly 
and its power over legislation comes the perilous relation 
which Mr. Justice Brewer says 'lifts the corporation into a 
position of constant danger and menace to republican 
institutions. '"17
Indeed, Congress designed the Hepburn Act (1906), along 
with the Elkins Act (1903) and Mann-Elkins Act (1910), to 
promote fairness within the railroad industry. The Elkins 
Act made shippers receiving discriminatory favors, such as 
rebates, subject to penalties and held railroad companies, 
not just their chief officers, responsible for violations. 
The act also made charging higher rates than those published 
a misdemeanor offense subject to court injunction.18
The Hepburn Act increased the size of the ICC and gave
17Congress, Senate, Regulation of Railroad Rates, 59th 
Congress, First Session, Congressional Record, vol. 40, no. 
6, daily ed., (April 23, 1906), S5722-23.
18"An Act To Further Regulate Commerce with Foreign 
Nations and Among the States" (Public Law 104, February 19, 
1903), 32 United States Statues at Large, 847-849; George 
Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of 
Experience (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
1969), 4.
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the commission authority to fix railroad shipping charges. 
Hepburn also made all ICC rate decisions binding, meaning 
that rail companies' only course of action was to appeal an 
unfavorable ruling in court. The Mann-Elkins Act, which 
received support from Roosevelt's hand-picked successor, 
William Howard Taft, created a special commerce court to 
hear railroad appeals of ICC decisions.19
Small farmers and merchants who formed the progressive 
movement's backbone in the Mid- and Far West responded 
enthusiastically to this legislation. But many railroad 
owners and pro-railroad congressmen also endorsed these 
initiatives. The Elkins Act reflected the railroads' 
distaste for rebating.20 Alexander J. Cassatt, president 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, made ending rebates his 
personal mission. He took a seven-year hiatus from 
railroading during the 1890s because the Pennsylvania 
refused to approve his plans to establish discipline within 
the Eastern railways. Upon returning to the business, 
Cassatt fought for and succeeded in bringing stability to
19,,An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 'An Act To Regulate 
Commerce' Approved February 4, 1887 . . . " (PL 337, June 29,
1906) 34 United States Statutes at Large, 584-595; "An Act
To Create a Commerce Court . . . "  (PL 218, June 28, 1910)
36 United States Statues at Large, 539-557; Hilton, The 
Transportation Act of 1958, 4.
20Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958, 4.
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the eastern lines.21
Even the Hepburn Act, which Roosevelt cited in the 1912 
presidential election as an example of his progressivism, 
received mild support from some railroad leaders or was 
ignored altogether.22 The act's most important provisions 
extended rate-making powers to the ICC and made rate 
decisions appealable only in a court of law. The Senate 
debated these two stipulations extensively because many 
senators questioned their constitutionality. The bill's 
detractors argued that granting the ICC rate-making powers 
would give a regulatory agency legislative capacity. If the 
railroad industry had decided to organize against the 
Hepburn Act, they certainly would have had potent ammunition 
with which to criticize the bill.23 But Railroad World, a 
trade publication that championed federal regulation, saw 
the Hepburn Act as non-threatening. The publication 
commented: "This Hepburn measure appears at present to be 
far milder than has been anticipated. If the amendments 
which are apparently insisted upon by the Senate . . . are
adopted we can see nothing in the measure threatening the
21George H. Burgess and Miles C. Kennedy, Centennial 
History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1846-1946 
(Philadelphia: 1949), 461.
22Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 55-56.
23Ibid., 132-38; Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958,
4-5.
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interests of the railroads."24
Some even believed that the railroad industry had 
inspired the Hepburn bill. Senator Isidor Rayner of 
Maryland told the Senate that the railroads "suggested" key 
elements of the bill. Rayner's statement was difficult to 
prove, but this did not stop the New York Press from 
declaring that "[Rayner's comment] explains why the railroad 
lobbies did not raise a note of public or private protest 
against the Hepburn bill in the House."25 The railroads 
probably did not have any direct control over the Hepburn 
bill's content and the bill's defenders used progressive 
ideas as the main rationale for passing the Act. Still, 
some supporters of the Hepburn Act did not want to punish 
the railroads, which were still intent on stabilizing their 
industry and saw expanding the ICC's powers to control rates 
as a way of accomplishing this goal. A more realistic 
appraisal would regard the Hepburn Act as a popular piece of 
progressive legislation that railroads also supported.
Some railroad leaders also defended the Mann-Elkins Act 
despite President Taft's support of the bill. Taft had a 
trust-busting reputation and in the 1908 presidential 
campaign, spoke of strengthening the ICC's power to control 
exorbitant rates while the Republican platform also
24Railroad World L (February 9, 1906), 123, quoted in
Kolko, 134.
25New York Press, March 16, 1906, quoted in Kolko, 138-
139.
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contained language to this effect. In an election year this 
anti-railroad, anti-trust rhetoric gained Taft progressive 
Republican support. After his election, though, Taft hinted 
that he supported a reduction in the ICC's powers. Taft's 
reversal put railroad leaders at ease, reassuring them that 
his railroad policy would not unleash anything radical or 
unexpected.26
The railroads' positive relationship with the federal 
government continued even after Democrat Woodrow Wilson 
entered office in 1912. Wilson's emphasis on business 
competition and small government seemed to conflict with 
railroad interests. At first, Wilson did not pay a great 
deal of attention to railroad affairs, but his appointment 
of pro-rail conservatives to the ICC in 1913 and 1914 won 
approval from railroad owners. During this same period, 
railroad profits dropped precipitously and many within the 
industry began calling for a rate increase.27 Wilson 
indicated his willingness to heed the railroads in a speech 
before Congress on January 20, 1914: "The antagonism between 
business and government is over. . . . The Government [sic]
and business men are ready to meet each other halfway in a 
common effort to square business methods with public opinion
26Wiebe, The Search for Order, 202-03.
27Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 140-142.
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and the law."28 Wilson was not speaking specifically about 
railroads, but his comments left the impression that he 
would listen to the industry's concerns.
Wilson's approval of shipping-interest lawyer Louis 
Brandeis's efforts to open railroad accounting books during 
the ICC's hearings on a proposed 5 percent rate increase 
strained this congenial atmosphere. But the ICC granted the 
increase in five states (the ICC eventually extended the 
increase to the entire Eastern territory), with Wilson's 
appointees leading the way to approval. Railroad profits 
increased significantly, but the "Five Percent Case" was 
important for one other reason: the ICC's decision expressed 
a duty to guarantee the railroads a "living wage." 
Essentially, the ICC promised the industry a profit as long 
as they provided quality service at reasonable rates. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission's purpose had gone beyond 
just regulating the railroads to include protecting and 
assisting private business in securing a profit.29
Railroad interests also defeated state regulation 
during Wilson's presidency. The rails wanted ICC rules to 
supersede any regulation that individual states might enact. 
Between 1902 and 1915, state legislatures passed almost
2SThe Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, III, edited by 
Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1926) 82, 84-85.
29Kolko, 210-211.
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1,800 laws containing-railroad regulation.30 Trying to 
satisfy frequently contradictory regulations was 
extraordinarily difficult. Furthermore, the railroads 
encountered far more hostility in state legislatures than 
they did when dealing with the ICC. Railroad leaders had 
worked hard to cultivate a harmonious relationship with the 
ICC and did not want overzealous state lawmakers to 
undermine this alliance. In their efforts to confirm the 
ICC's position as the supreme being of regulation, railroad 
leaders denied any effort to circumvent the positive 
relationship between their industry and the federal 
government.31
In Houston E & W Texas Railroad Co. v. U. S. (the 
Shreveport case) and the 1913 Minnesota rate cases, the 
Supreme Court sided with the railroads on state versus 
federal regulation but did not rescind the states' power to 
enact regulatory legislation. As Wilson campaigned for a 
second term in office, he called for a complete
30Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways 
in the United States, 1916 (Washington: GPO, 1918), 98.
31See Mansel Griffiths Blackford, "Businessmen and the 
Regulation of Railroads and Public Utilities in California 
During the Progressive Era," in Robert F. Himmelberg, ed., 
Growth of the Regulatory State, 1990-1917: State Federal 
Regulation of Railroads and Other Enterprises, Vol. 3 of 
Business and Government in America Since 1870 (New York: 
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph 
of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 
1900-1916 (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 5-6; Kolko, 
Railroads and Regulation, 89-90, 202-225 for discussion of 
state efforts to regulate the railroad industry and the 
industry's desire to frustrate these efforts.
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investigation of state versus federal railroad regulation. 
Republicans went even further. In their 1916 platform, the 
GOP called for complete federal control, by constitutional 
amendment if necessary.32
World War I put this debate on hold. Wilson seized 
control of the rails, which transported personnel and 
materials for the war effort. The Wilson administration 
rewarded the railroad industry for its military service with 
the Federal Railroad Control Act of 1918. The ICC followed 
with a 2 5 percent freight rate increase that rapidly 
expanded railroad coiffures. Between 1916 and 192 0, freight 
revenue per ton-mile rose from 72 cents to $1.07 and 
operating revenue from $2.7 billion to $5.3 billion.33
The Transportation Act of 192 0 was also popular among 
railroad owners, although some of the largest, strongest 
railroads did object to the Act's recapture clause. The 
clause ordered all carriers earning more than 6 percent of 
the value of its property to pay one-half of the excess 
profits into an ICC fund for loans to smaller lines. The 
provision's intention was to aid smaller, weaker lines that 
could not turn a profit when following an ICC rate schedule 
established for all railroads. The stronger lines did not
32George G. Reynolds, The Distribution of Power to 
Regulate Interstate Carriers Between Nations and States (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1928) 137-42, contains a
discussion of these two cases and their significance.
33Kolko, 228.
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want to pay into this fund, but other provisions of the Act 
helped mitigate their dissatisfaction with the recapture 
clause.34 The Transportation Act established a 5.5 to 6 
percent profit margin as the minimum standard for railroad 
prosperity while furthering the 5 percent decision's 
principle of guaranteeing railroads a profit. The act also 
enlarged the ICC's membership, permitted pooling, gave the 
Commission power to set minimum fees, and established 
federal regulation's superiority in the areas of rate 
preferences and discrimination. Under the Wilson 
administration, railroad owners completed creating the 
conditions deemed desirable when the push for stability 
through federal regulation began forty years earlier.35
When this quest began, turmoil and cut-throat 
competition that ate away at profits plagued the railroad 
industry. Realizing their desperate situation, rail leaders 
attempted to eliminate rivalries. Federal regulation became 
the means of achieving this goal. In the process, the ICC 
became a shield for the railroads against hostile local
34I . L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 5 
vols. (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931-1937), I, 211-15; 
Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation (New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1928), 826-849; 
William Norris Leonard, Railroad Consolidation Under the 
Transportation Act of 1920 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1946), 59-60, 217.
35,,An Act To Provide for Federal Control of the 
Railroads and Systems of Transportation . . . "  
(Transportation Act of 1920) (PL 152, February 28, 1920) 41 
United States Statues at Large, 456-499.
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lawmakers.
Moreover, government regulation did not represent 
progressivism. The progressive movement sought to make 
society's dominant- economic entities accountable to the 
people through government regulation and attempted to 
balance economic power within the country. But Congress and 
the various presidents who enacted railroad regulation 
between 1887 and 1920 did not always intend to achieve these 
goals. These men sought to bring order to a chaotic 
industry. Therefore, progressivism played an essential but 
incidental role in creating railroad regulation. Popular 
sentiment declared that monopolies like the railroad 
industry posed a threat to the average individual's 
economic, political, and social freedom. But when the 
nation's politicians looked at the railroads, they saw an 
economic force that had played a key role in generating 
unprecedented economic prosperity. Because the railroads 
were the nation's only transportation system capable of 
handling the demands of an ever-expanding economy, Congress 
and Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson saw regulation as 
a way to guarantee the survival and prosperity of the 
railroad industry and the nation. Along the path to this 
goal, the executive and legislative branches indulged in 
rhetoric that expressed the desire to enhance individual 
opportunity and promote the general welfare. Implicit in 
this rhetoric was the idea that the general welfare would be
32
served if government protected the railroads' welfare.
Railroad regulation created an industry guaranteed a 
profit, but also made the rails exceedingly inflexible and 
unresponsive to competition. In the 1910s and 192 0s, this 
inflexibility was inconsequential because competition had 
been virtually eliminated. But as other forms of 
transportation developed, government requirements such as 
rate publication and the restriction on changing these rates 
for a thirty-day period became serious obstacles to the 
railroads' ability to compete. Just as the railroads 
succeeded in guaranteeing their future success, another mode 
of transit— the motor vehicle— began to mature. Eventually, 
the changing nature of America's transportation demands 
would generate a marked decrease in federal concern for the 
railroad industry while creating enthusiastic federal 
support for highway construction aimed at meeting both 
interstate and urban transportation demands.36
36See Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Problems of the Railroads, Part 1, 85th 
Congress, 2d Session (GPO: Washington, D.C.: 1958) for a 
full discussion of how regulation hindered the railroads' 
ability to compete with other forms of transportation.
CHAPTER II
Roads to the Future:
The Birth of the Interstate Highway System
In 1919, Army Captain Dwight David Eisenhower traveled 
across the country as part of a military convoy. The 
purpose of Eisenhower's journey was not to deploy troops or 
engage in any other activity typically associated with the 
armed forces. Instead, the objective of the mission was to 
point out the need for better roads across the United 
States. The army believed that modernizing the nation's 
road system would improve its ability to mobilize within the 
country's borders. The expedition encountered countless 
obstacles and revealed that the nation's roads were in need 
of major improvements.1
Eisenhower's experience in Europe during World War II 
also influenced his thinking on transportation. He "had 
seen the superlative system of the German Autobahnen—  
national highways crossing that country and offering the 
possibility, often lacking in the United States, to drive
!Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to 
Friends (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 
1967), 153-54, 157; John Wickman, "Ike and The Great Truck 
Train," Kansas History 13 (Autumn, 1990): 139-148.
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with speed and safety at the same time."2 Eisenhower often 
talked about the nation's highway system after his ascension 
to the presidency. He saw American roads as much improved 
since the 1919 convoy trip, but still inadequate to provide 
for the country's transportation needs.3 Eisenhower made 
improving the nation's roads an objective of his first 
administration. In doing so, Eisenhower identified 
automobiles and trucks as the mode of transportation 
Americans would use most in the coming decades. This belief 
led to a construction plan that viewed highways as a 
solution to urban traffic problems as well as a method of 
evacuating cities in case of nuclear attack. Marty railroad 
and mass transit advocates raised objections to these 
sections of the administration's plan, but these interests 
found that Congress and the president did not listen to 
their concerns as attentively as they had during the 
Progressive Era.
The country's road system evolved from Indian paths 
and from trails that the first colonists carved as they 
began to move inland. Gradually, a road connected all the
2Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate 
for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1963), 548.
3A good example of Eisenhower's position on the 
highways can be found in "Special Message to Congress 
Regarding a Nation Highway Program," February 22, 1955, 
Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1959), 275-76.
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colonies on which "post riders carried mail once a month (in 
summer) along the six-hundred-mile route between Boston and 
Williamsburg."4 The stagecoaches' popularity during the 
latter half of the eighteenth century brought more roads 
into existence. Railroads, however, led to highway neglect 
because the rails provided the best means of moving both 
passengers and freight over long distances.5
The Duryea brothers' construction of the first gasoline 
operated motorcar in 1893 began shifting America's attention 
away from the locomotive and onto the automobile. There 
were 8,000 cars in the U. S. by 1900 and 458,500 by 1910.
By 1925, Americans owned 20 million automobiles.6 In 1916, 
the federal government became increasingly involved in 
constructing roads. Federal aid to highways came with the 
condition that each state create a highway department 
responsible for choosing road locations. This initial aid 
program also established that the individual states and the 
federal government would split the cost of highway projects. 
The Department of Commerce established the Office of Public
Quotation from Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Public Roads, Highways in the United States (Washington:
GPO, 1954), 1. This publication provides an overview of 
highway development in the United States.
5Helen Leavitt, Superhighway-Superhoax (Garden City , 
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), 22.
6Bureau of Public Roads, Highways in the United States, 
2; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Highway 
Statistics: Summary to 1955 (Washington: GPO, 1957), 18-19.
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Roads (later to become the Bureau of Public Roads) to 
oversee federal funding of highway construction. Many 
states imposed a tax on gasoline and the revenue from this 
tax was put aside specifically for highway construction.7
During the 19 3 0s, the federal government struggled to 
build enough roads to keep up with the ever growing number 
of vehicles traveling America's highways. Two New Deal 
programs, the Civil Works Administration and the Works 
Progress Administration, constructed and repaired 500,000 
miles of roadway. The Bureau of Public Roads also spent 
depression relief money while working with state highway 
departments to study expanding road demand.8
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended these 
efforts. During World War II, the United States used 
highways extensively to ship goods and raw materials to and 
from factories and to transport workers to and from their 
jobs. This crucial role in the war effort had a 
debilitating effect on the nation's highways. During the 
war years, Congress allocated no money for highway
7Leavitt, Superhighway-Superhoax, 22-23; Mark Rose, 
Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville, 
Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 4, 8-9.
8William Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 121; John
B. Rae, The Road and the Car in American Life (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press), 74.
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construction and upkeep.9 At war's end, the country faced 
further problems as millions of GIs returned and began 
settling not in the cities, but in the suburbs. This 
migration greatly expanded the roadside economy that began 
developing during the 1920s to serve highway travelers. 
Fueling stations multiplied and motels and hotels achieved 
respectability as the American family took to the road on 
vacation. McDonald's sprang up to feed hungry travelers, 
and a new institution— the shopping mall— featured acres and 
acres of parking to draw customers out of the increasingly 
dangerous and congested cities.10
Toward the war's end, the Roosevelt administration 
attempted to deal with highway deterioration. The Federal- 
Aid Highway Act of 1944 appropriated $1.5 billion for road 
rehabilitation, but this amount simply was not enough to 
solve the enormous difficulties that existed.11
But the 1944 legislation did have a lasting impact on
9Bureau of Public Roads, Highways in the United States, 
3-4; Congress, House, Message from the President of the 
United States, Highway Needs for National Defense 
(Washington: GPO, 1949), 85-87.
10Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985) is the best source on the post-war suburban 
boom. Also see Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for 
Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 
550-554.
uRose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, 
25-27; Bruce E. Seely, Building the American Highway System: 
Engineers as Policymakers (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1987), 187-191.
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how the federal government would manage highway affairs. 
Thomas H. MacDonald, the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Public Roads, established the National System of Interstate 
Highways within the Federal-Aid Act of 1944. The interstate 
system's routes were a subdivision of the primary highway 
system and "connected all the major cities and production 
centers . . . and are the most heavily traveled in the
country."12 Separating certain roads into a distinct group 
of interstate highways laid the groundwork for future road 
construction legislation that would focus on this interstate 
system. MacDonald also succeeded in setting aside a small 
amount of money ($125 million) for highways within urban 
areas. This action set a precedent that would also become 
important in the future.13
By 1954, forty-eight million cars, and ten million 
trucks traveled American roads.14 But the highway system 
still could not meet those vehicles' demands and all those 
concerned agreed that the nation's highway network needed
12Bureau of Public Roads, Highways in the United States,
5.
13John B. Rae, The American Automobile: A Brief History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 186-87;
Richard O. Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the 
Freeway, and the Condition of Metropolitan America 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1975), 13.
14Congress, House, The President's Advisory Committee on 
a National Highway Program. A National Highway Program: A 
Report to the President. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955,
3 .
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improvement. Solving this problem became the mission of 
what has been described as the "most unique and massive 
coalition of single-minded pressure ever to hit the American 
scene."15 The "highway lobby," a diverse group comprised of 
interests including car manufacturers, oil companies, 
automobile and trucking associations, and state and federal 
road officials, agreed on one crucial point: the current 
highway system was obsolete and in desperate need of 
modernization.16 R. H. Baldock, a member of the American 
Association of State Highway Officials, echoed this 
dissatisfaction when testifying before Congress in 1953. He 
stated: "The highways, as they currently exist, are 
obsolete, worn out, and cannot fulfill traffic demands. It 
is my opinion that this is taking a terrible toll on our 
entire economy and I think it is one of the most important 
issues before the people of this country."17
In the early 1950s, the highway lobby formed Project 
Adequate Roads (PAR). The PAR highlighted the need for 
further highway construction and tried to reconcile the 
divergent opinions within the lobby on how road development
15Quotation from Paul Ylvisaker, "The Deserted City," 
Journal of American Institute of Planners 2 5 (February, 
1959): 5.
16Davies, The Age of Asphalt, describes the highway 
lobby as containing these interests, 20.
17Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, National 
Highway Study: Hearings before the Committee on Public 
Works, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 231.
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and improvement should proceed. Some promoted a national 
toll road system, arguing that those who used the highways 
should help pay for them. Toll roads would also serve as a 
mechanism to test highway needs. If traffic on the toll 
roads did not create sufficient income, then further highway 
construction was not needed. At the other extreme, the 
Bureau of Public Roads advocated an ambitious, toll-free 
system financed entirely by the federal government. This 
wide range of opinions prevented the PAR from developing a 
plan for future highway construction.18
As the PAR struggled to formulate a road policy, state 
and federal highway officials studied methods of meeting the 
nation's transportation demands. State and federal studies 
consistently concluded that more highways were the solution. 
These state and federal officials, however, had a personal 
interest in seeing highway construction increased.19 For 
this reason, it is not accurate to assume that highway
18Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, The 
Federal Highway Act of 1954: Hearings before the Committee 
on Public Works, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1954, 30; Rose, 
Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, 70.
19Examples of state road studies which advocated further 
highway construction can be found in Congress, House, 
Committee on Public Works, H.R. 42 60: To Create a Federal 
Highway Corporation for Financing the Construction of the 
National System of Interstate Highways: Hearings before the 
Committee on Public Works, 84th Congress, 1st session, 1955, 
54-67, 433 and Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, 
Letter from the Secretary of Commerce: Needs of the Highway 
Systems, 1955-84, report prepared by the Commissioner of 
Public Roads in cooperation with the several state highway 
departments, 84th Congress, 1st session, 1954, 1-2 2.
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construction was the inevitable result of the automobile's 
popularity. The Bureau of Public Roads, along with the 
various state highway departments, asserted a high degree of 
influence over highway policy. The Bureau established a set 
of goals it wished to attain. This "wish list" included 
building free, not toll roads, emphasized the primacy of 
urban highways, and maintained that the BPR should have some 
influence over choosing interstate system routes. Despite 
the partisan nature of its position on these and many other 
highway-related issues, the BPR maintained a reputation for 
apolitical expertise in the eyes of Congress and others 
interested in highway policy. Thus, the BPR influenced 
almost every major feature of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1956 without Congress or the Eisenhower administration 
perceiving the Bureau as a special interest group attempting 
to promote highway legislation.20
Thomas MacDonald, who had been instrumental in creating 
the National System of Interstate Highways as Commissioner 
of Public Roads in the 1940s, also continued to influence 
highway policy. He supported constructing new highways 
because traffic, particularly in the cities, had increased 
faster than expected after World War II. In 1946, MacDonald 
wrote that the most important question facing American
20Seely, Building the American Highway System: Engineers 
as Policy Makers, is the best source on the BPR's influence 
over highway policy during the twentieth century.
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cities was if "we should build highways which will enable 
traffic to move into and through the city quickly and 
safely, or should we try to get along with things the way 
they are?" MacDonald believed that "cities which refused to 
modernize their highways will pay a heavy price in loss of 
business and depreciation of property values in central 
business districts. "21
Earlier highway projects had emphasized improving the 
movement of people and cargo between cities. MacDonald, 
however, viewed highways as a cure for urban transportation 
problems. He excluded all other means of transportation, 
such as commuter rails and rapid transit systems, that might 
have helped solve these difficulties. The Bureau of Public 
Roads incorporated this change in emphasis into its official 
position on how highway construction should proceed. In a 
1954 policy statement, the bureau recommended the 
"development of the interstate highway system and the 
secondary road system into urban areas."22
In 1954, the Eisenhower administration formulated a 
plan to meet highway demands. On July 12, Vice-President 
Richard Nixon made a speech before the nation's governors
21Quotations from Thomas H. MacDonald, "The Case for 
Urban Expressways," American City 61 (November, 1946): 116.
22Leavitt, Superhighway-Superhoax, 7-8; Quotation from 
Congress, House, Federal Highway Act of 1954: Hearings 
Before the Committee on Public Works, 83rd Congress, 1st 
Session, 1954, 15.
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supporting McDonald's position on developing an urban 
highway system. The Vice-President said:
The nation's highway network is obsolete and 
inadequate. Although it has been adjusted to meet 
metropolitan traffic gluts, transcontinental movement, 
and increased horsepower, it has never been completely 
overhauled or planned to satisfy the needs of the 10 
years ahead. Therefore, [this administration] is 
calling for a grand plan for a properly articulated 
[highway program] that solves the problems of speedy, 
safe continental travel, intercity transportation . . .
and metropolitan area congestion.23
Vice-President Nixon's statement echoed MacDonald's 
position by calling not only for an intercity highway 
system, but also for a system that would relieve inner city 
congestion. By asserting that the highway system could 
solve intracity transportation problems, Nixon also 
supported using highways as a cure for urban transportation 
problems while neglecting mass transit alternatives. This 
myopic view of transportation problems and solutions did not 
deter support for Nixon's plan. In fact, the speech "had an 
electrifying effect on the governors, state highway 
officials, and groups interested in highways."24
The Eisenhower administration then ventured to develop
23Congress, House, The President's Advisory Committee on 
a National Highway Program, A National Highway Program: A 
Report to the President. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955,
1 .
24Quotation from "Memorandum from highway consultant 
Robert Newcomb to the Council of Economic Advisors," August 
23, 1954, in The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961: A 
Documentary History, Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. 
Larsen, editors (New York: Random House, 1971), 539.
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a plan that would satisfy the various groups interested in 
highway construction. This rather ambitious task fell to 
retired General Lucius D. Clay, whom Eisenhower appointed to 
head a Special Advisory Committee. General Clay, a member 
of the board of directors at General Motors, selected 
supporters of highway construction to serve on this 
committee. The committee Clay convened consisted of Sloan 
Colt, the President of Bankers Trust, Steven Bechtel, who 
operated one of the largest construction companies in 
America at the time, William Roberts, who headed Allis- 
Chalmers, a company that built construction equipment, and 
David Beck of the Teamsters Union.25
From the outset, the committee agreed that "The 
existing [highway] system is inadequate for both current and 
future needs and must be improved to meet the urgent 
requirements of . . .  an expanding economy."26 The 
committee heard from the American Automobile Association, 
who "regarded the interstate highway system to be of utmost 
importance and therefore, recommends aggressive federal
25In Jean Edward Smith's Lucius D . Clay: An American 
Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 618-19, Clay admits 
that these individuals made for a "loaded committee," but 
"if we were going to build highways, I [Clay] wanted people 
who knew something about highways."
26Quotation from Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway 
Program: A Report to the President, xiii.
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action to improve this system."27 The Highway Municipal 
Association believed the "Federal government should 
concentrate its efforts on the interstate system. Cities are 
the most critical area and Federal highway legislation 
should recognize this fact."28 The National Association of 
Motor Bus Operators asserted that "Federal aid should be 
heavily concentrated upon the interstate system: $2 billion 
per year for ten years for this purpose merits serious 
consideration.1,29 Finally, controversial New York City 
planner Robert Moses recommended "at least $50 billion in 
the next 10 years for highways, including $15 billion in 
metropolitan areas."30 Moses went on to argue that the 
urban system was of the greatest importance, but also faced 
the greatest resistance from forces within the cities.
Local opposition, Moses stated, could be "overcome by 
establishing engineering and other standards which can only 
be departed from at risk of loss of federal and state aid of 
all kinds."31 In other words, Moses contended that cities 
should be required to build more highways and if they
27Quotation from Congress, House, The President's 
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program, Hearings 
on a National Highway Program, 8 3rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
1954, 215.
28Ibid. , 246-47.
29Ibid. , 340.
30Ibid. , 347.
31Ibid. , 348.
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refused, then all government aid to them would be cut off.
Everyone concerned agreed that the problem stemmed from 
the road system's inability to accommodate expanding traffic 
volumes. If the roads could not meet the country's demands, 
the Clay committee could have addressed this problem on a 
more expansive level that would examine not only highways, 
but the entire transportation system. A broader context 
might have caused the committee to realize that it faced two 
different problems: How to improve intercity travel and how 
to alleviate urban traffic congestion. By the early 1950s, 
highway routes between cities had become obsolete. The 
automobile, however, was not the only means of 
transportation used for intracity travel. Robert Moses 
highlighted urban congestion in his testimony before the 
Advisory Committee when he argued that "the needs of the 
cities must not be minimized because they require relatively 
little mileage. This is strategic mileage of vital 
importance to both the interstate and urban systems."32 But 
drawing people away from the highways, and therefore, 
substantially cutting the number of vehicles traveling on 
urban expressways also could have solved urban congestion. 
Accomplishing this task would have required more funding for 
other means of transportation such as commuter railways and 
rapid transit systems. The Clay Committee, however, did not
32Ibid. , 347.
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hear from mass transportation representatives. The Advisory 
committee ignored alternatives to highways and did not weigh 
the consequences of an automobile-dominated transportation 
system. Furthermore, the committee failed to consider what 
effect the highways might have on other transit systems or 
the highways' impact on the urban environment.33
Others forwarded ideas that the committee could have 
consulted. City planner Harland Bartholomew urged a 
balanced approach to improving urban transportation. In a 
1954 article, Bartholomew stated:
It is in our best interest to thoroughly develop 
sound mass transportation. This approach does not mean 
halting individual automobile traffic. It does mean 
restricting it where necessary for better 
accommodations for the majority of the traveling 
public. It does mean giving mass transportation first 
consideration as the basic and predominant means
of transportation. It does mean restricting the 
automobile to its rightful place as a supplemental 
vehicle to be accommodated only after major 
transportation needs have been provided for.34
Bartholomew, however, did not testify before the Clay
committee, nor did any other advocates of solutions that did
^Representatives of interests that testified before the 
President's Advisory Committee included the American 
Trucking Association, the Automobile Manufacturers' 
Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the 
American Automobile Association, the Associated General 
Contractors, the Automotive Safety Foundation, and the 
National Highway Users Conference. This list, although 
incomplete, is a fair sample of the highway interests that 
presented their arguments before the Advisory Committee. 
Congress, House, Hearings on a National Highway Program, 
viii.
34Harland Bartholomew, "Planning for Metro Transport," 
Planning and Civic Comment 105 (September, 1954): 4.
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not endorse further highway construction.
The American Transit Association (ATA), a national 
organization that represented urban transit interests, sent 
a letter to the committee after its hearings were completed. 
In this letter, the association "noted that an opportunity 
had recently been accorded the American Trucking 
Association, the National Association of Motor Bus 
Operators, the American Automobile Association, and other 
highway users to submit statements on national highway 
matters." Not having been invited to submit a statement, 
the ATA pointed out that "sight is lost of the fact that as 
new expressways and freeways feed more and more automobiles 
into already crowded urban districts, the problem of traffic 
congestion becomes more acute." The influx of additional 
cars would overburden city street systems and "create a 
demand for constantly enlarged off-street parking 
facilities, the combined effect being an ever-increasing 
drain upon our national economy for the provision of 
facilities for the primary use of the private motorist."
The ATA also maintained that "there will have to be 
continuing dependence upon public transit facilities if the 
central business districts of our cities are to survive and 
prosper. "35
35Quotations from George W. Anderson, executive Vice- 
President of the American Transit Association, to the 
President's Advisory Committee on a National Highway 
Program, October 25, 1954. Quoted in Davies, The Age of
49
The transit association's letter demonstrated that they 
understood where future problems would develop if the 
government built more highways. They saw traffic gridlock 
and inadequate parking facilities as formidable obstacles in 
attracting people to urban business areas. The Advisory 
Committee, however, turned a deaf ear on the ATA's plea to 
consider mass transit alternatives. In the committee's 
final report to President Eisenhower, Clay and his 
associates stated that their "Committee was created to 
consider the highway network, and other media of 
transportation do not fall within its province."36
The Advisory Committee devised a ten-year, $27 billion 
interstate highway construction program. The Clay committee 
asserted that the interstates were the most important part 
of the road system because they carried "more than one- 
seventh of all traffic, one-fifth of the rural traffic, 
serve 65 percent of the urban population, and 45 percent of 
the rural population, and is the key network from the 
standpoint of Federal interest in productivity and national
Asphalt, 60-63.
36Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway Program: A Report 
to the President, 3. Also see Congress, Senate, Subcommittee 
on Surface Transportation, "Correspondence, vol. 1," File 
84, Box 4, Record Group 46, National Archives, Washington,
D. C. for additional criticism of the Eisenhower 
administration's use of highways to solve urban 
transportation problems.
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defense."37 The committee endorsed raising funds for this 
project through a newly established Federal Highway 
Corporation that would issue $25 billion in bonds. Funds 
collected from the federal tax on gasoline and lubricating 
oils would retire these bonds over a thirty-year period.
The federal corporation would redirect this tax money from 
the general fund into a separate Highway Trust Fund account. 
The Clay committee believed that revenue from the gasoline 
and lubricating oil tax would increase dramatically as 
traffic increased, thus allowing the federal government to 
pay for 9 0 percent of the proposed interstate highway 
program.38
Although Clay maintained that "the entire economy of 
the United States is built on transportation . . .  in all 
fields; rail, air, water, and highway," he also believed 
that the "automobile occupies a very unique place in the 
transportation system of the United States, not only for the 
movement of goods and persons, but it has indeed become a 
part of our social structure.1,39 Despite the Advisory
37Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway Program: A Report 
to the President, 5.
38Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, H.R. 4260: 
To Create a Federal Highway Corporation for Financing the 
Construction of the National System of Interstate Highways: 
Hearings Before the Committee on Public Works, 84th 
Congress, 1st Session, 129-30.
39Lucius D. Clay, "A New National Highway Program," 
Virginia Municipal Review 32 (January, 1955), 8.
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Committee's failure to examine the transportation system as 
a whole, Clay viewed his committee's proposal as a "bold 
measure" that would solve traffic congestion problems well 
into the future and would "contribute to the well-being of 
America. "40
President Eisenhower endorsed the findings of his 
Advisory Committee's findings and on February 22, 1955, he 
delivered a special message to Congress on the proposed 
program. Eisenhower identified four reasons for building 
more highways. First, he asserted that the road system was 
unsafe. During the early 1950s, traffic accidents killed 
over thirty-six thousand people and injured over one million 
more. Eisenhower believed that further highway construction 
and improvement would help save lives.41 Second, the 
president cited the immediate economic benefits of 
constructing the interstate highway system. He said "the 
physical condition of the present roads increases the cost 
of vehicle operation by as much as one cent per mile of 
vehicle travel. At the present rate of travel, this totals 
more than $5 billion a year."42 The president looked upon 
improving the highways as a positive step toward reducing
40Ibid. , 9.
41U. S. President, Public Papers of the President of the 
United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1959), 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, 276.
42Ibid. , 276.
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this extra cost that "was passed on through each step in the 
distribution of goods" and "paid ultimately by the 
individual consumer."43
Third, the government estimated that by 1965, eighty- 
one million vehicles would be traveling American roads. The 
United States needed highway improvement and development or 
"existing traffic jams will only faintly foreshadow those of 
ten years hence."44 Fourth, Eisenhower invoked Cold War 
fears to establish merit for highway construction: "In case 
of atomic attack on our cities, the roads must permit quick 
evacuation of target areas, mobilization of defense forces 
and maintenance of every essential economic function. But 
the present system in critical areas would be the breeder of 
a deadly congestion within hours of attack."45
Once again, the Eisenhower administration saw highway 
Construction as a way of solving urban problems. Clay's 
Advisory Committee had endorsed highway construction as a 
means to move people around and through cities. Here, the 
president advocated using highways to evacuate cities in the 
event of nuclear attack. But this purpose, like the Clay 
committee's rationale for building more highways, also 
contained some serious defects.
43Ibid. , 276.
^Ibid., 276.
45Ibid. , 276.
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General Clay had been the director of New York State's 
civil defense program during the early 1950s. While 
planning the evacuation of New York City in case of nuclear 
attack, Clay realized "it would take more than an hour to 
empty some of New York's larger skyscrapers."46 Such a 
lengthy evacuation time would minimize the highways' 
effectiveness because the Strategic Air Command did not 
expect significant advanced warning of an attack. Still, 
many highway supporters latched onto the idea that more 
highways would help evacuate cities during a crisis. The 
Clay committee report stressed that "the capacity of the 
interstate highways to transport urban populations in an 
emergency is of utmost importance. Large-scale evacuation 
would be needed in the event of an A-Bomb or H-Bomb 
attack."47 The report also relied on testimony from the 
Federal Civil Defense Administrator, who asserted that "the 
withdrawal task is the biggest problem ever faced in the 
world.1148
When congressional debate began on the president's 
highway program, many highway lobbyists cited national and 
civil defense as reason to build more highways. George T. 
McCoy, President of the American Association of State
46Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life, 57 6.
47Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway Program: A Report 
to the President, 5.
48Ibid. , 5.
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Highway Officials, stated that the interstate system should 
be expanded "because of the unsettled nature of 
international affairs. With new instruments of war, we 
might not in the future be spared the horrors of being in an 
active military theater."49 Managing Director of the 
American Trucking Association John V. Lawrence asserted "If 
the Interstate System is as important to the military and 
civilian defense of the Nation [sic] as indicated, the 10- 
year [highway] program . . . seems vital. Current newspaper
headlines would indicate that if we had the system today it 
would be none too soon."50 Automobile Manufacturers 
Association President James J. Nance said that:
our roads and streets are not now capable of 
meeting demands they may face in the event of another 
war— which may call for mass evacuation of large cities 
and extreme reliance on a form of transportation that, 
because of its flexibility and its sheer number of 
units, is less vulnerable to paralysis under large- 
scale bombing attacks against the continent.51
In his testimony before Congress, General Clay stated
that the "total bearing of the cost [for the highways] by
the federal government was justified because these roads
have been certified as necessary to national defense . . .
and urgent to the civil defense program for the evacuation
49Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, Bills 
Related to the National Highway Program: Hearings Before 
Subcommittee on Roads of the Committee on Public Works, 84th 
Congress, 1st Session, 1955, 156.
50Ibid. , 531.
51Ibid. , 487.
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of our cities."52 Several members of Congress raised 
objections to this motive. Senator Patrick McNamara of 
Michigan doubted the public's ability to effectively use the 
highways as an escape route. He declared that the "most 
modern and best designed highways in the country would not 
last ten minutes as a means of escape when people are 
running for their lives."53 Senator Albert Gore of 
Tennessee also had "grave doubts about the feasibility of 
evacuating, for instance, New York City."54 General Clay 
answered these doubts by drawing on his experience as New 
York State's civil defense director. He did yield to the 
argument that the highways were not a cure all for 
evacuation needs, but he did not acknowledge the doubts he 
had expressed himself when he looked at New York City.55
During the 1950s, advancing civil defense rationales 
for building the interstate highway system was an effective 
method of winning support for the program. The Cold War 
bred fear of atomic warfare in American society and 
Eisenhower and other highway supporters manipulated these 
fears to gain approval for the highway program. Eisenhower 
spelled out the interstate program's economic and safety
52Ibid. , 395.
53Ibid. , 405.
54Ibid. , 406.
55Ibid. , 408-414.
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benefits and then added grimly worded rhetoric describing 
"our obsolescent highways, too small for the flood of 
traffic of an entire city's people going one way," turning 
"into traps of death and destruction"56 to drive home the 
need for the interstate highway system. Furthermore,
General Clay's recollection of Eisenhower's original 
reasoning for more highways did not contain a civil or 
national defense pretense. He remembered the president and 
Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, being "concerned 
for the economy. We were facing a possible recession, and 
he [Eisenhower] wanted to have something on the books that 
would enable us to move quickly if we had to go into public 
works.1,57
Civil defense rationales for the interstate system were 
dubious at best, but military leaders also made an effective 
argument that the proposed interstate highway system was 
important to national defense and military mobilization.
The military had supported road construction and improvement 
for defense purposes since the days of Eisenhower's convoy 
trip across the nation. During World War II, the highways 
had proved their worth in transporting workers and goods to 
and from factories. In 1955, Major General Paul F. Yount, 
Chief of Transportation for the United States Army, stated
56Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, 501.
57Smith, Lucius D . Clay: An American Life, 618.
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that "Today's crucial defense needs lie in improving to 
modern standards the forty-thousand-mile Interstate Highway 
System. This vital network must be able to handle the 
volume and weight of military and industrial traffic that 
will flood our highways in the event of a national 
emergency.,|58
Providing for military use of the highways, however, 
was not taken into consideration when construction began on 
the new highway system. In her book, Superhighway- 
Superhoax, Helen Leavitt points out that road builders set 
the clearance for bridges at fourteen feet. "As early as 
1954, the size of the Atlas missile, which exceeded the 14- 
foot minimum, was well established and the difficulties of 
transporting the weapon from California to Cape Kennedy were 
known in 1956 when the interstate system was launched."59 
Not until 1960 was a standard established to accommodate a 
vertical clearance of sixteen feet. "During those four years 
more than 2 000 bridges or structures were built to the 
obsolete standard."60 Leavitt concluded that this glaring 
discrepancy resulted from a lack of genuine concern "for the 
defense role the highway system would play, since labeling 
the system vital to our national defense was simply a
58Jay Dugan, "Highways in National Defense," Freedom of 
the American Road (Detroit: The Ford Motor Company), 18.
59Leavitt, Superhighways-Superhoax, 187-88.
60Ibid. , 188.
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'sweetening' device to gain support for the program in 
1956.61
61Ibid. , 188.
CHAPTER III
Eight Hoover Dams and Six Sidewalks to the Moon:
The Battle for the Interstate Highway System
After General Clay's Special Advisory Committee made 
its recommendations for an expanded highway program,
Congress spent more than a year and a-half debating the 
plan's merits and drawbacks. The final bill, passed by both 
houses of Congress and signed by President Eisenhower on 
July 29, 1956, represented total victory for those who 
championed a federally-funded highway system that solved 
both interstate and intracity transportation problems. 
Railroad representatives vigorously resisted a federally 
subsidized interstate highway system, but their industry's 
economic vitality and influence over transportation policy 
had dwindled significantly since the era of cooperation 
between the railroads and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.
As congressional debate on the interstate highway 
system began, the railroad industry was mulling over a 
proposal to petition the Interstate Commerce Commission for 
a 15 percent rate hike. Because of the industry's weak 
position, railroad leaders wanted to ascertain the impact of
59
60
a new interstate highway system on their industry.1 But 
railroad interests could not immediately appraise the 
situation because a temporary but radical shift in the two 
major parties' fiscal philosophies occurred during opening 
debates on the highway proposal.
The administration-backed Clay program would create a 
Federal Highway Corporation to oversee highway funding. The 
corporation's executive board would issue $25 billion in 
bonds and would pay off these bonds over the following 
thirty years.2 This financing scheme threw congressional 
Democrats into a state of shock. For twenty years they had 
been criticized for attempting to increase government 
spending and implement what some Republicans believed was a 
socialist agenda. The New Deal's most strident opponents 
had argued that Franklin Roosevelt's policies would swell 
the national debt, which, in turn, would bankrupt future 
generations. Three years after finally defeating those who 
sought to pursue such irresponsible fiscal policy, the new 
Republican administration introduced a bill to spend an 
enormous amount of tax revenue on a public works project 
much like those proposed under the New Deal. Despite 
Eisenhower and Clay's vigorous efforts to lobby Congress,
1New York Times, September 19, 1955.
2The Clay proposal's financing plan can be found in 
Congress, House, The President's Advisory Committee on a 
National Highway Program. A National Highway Program: A 
Report to the President. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955, 
20-21 .
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the Senate's Democratic majority made sure that the Clay 
committee's proposal never reached the Senate floor.3
But the Clay proposal's defeat did not mean that the 
new interstate system was dead. Virtually all highway 
legislation brought before Congress during the twentieth 
century faced one similar obstacle: "Everyone loves roads, 
but no one wants to pay for them."4 Senator Albert Gore of 
Tennessee drew up an alternate bill that dealt with 
financial concerns by completely ignoring them. Gore left 
finding the money for new highways to the House of 
Representatives, where all bills requiring tax money were 
supposed to originate. But Senator Gore's alterations did 
not stop there. He adamantly disagreed with the emphasis 
that Clay and the Eisenhower administration had placed on 
the interstate highway system. Gore's bill reflected his 
dissent by reducing the highway program's length from ten to 
five years and by cutting the amount spent on the interstate 
system from $25 billion to $5.5 billion, while decreasing 
the secondary and rural road allocation by just $1.5
3Theodore H. White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 
Collier's 137 (January 6, 1956), 48; Mark H. Rose, 
Interstate: Expressway Highway Politics, 1939-1989
(Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 
1990), 76.
4White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 47.
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billion.5 The proposal conflicted with the highway lobby's 
interests because their endorsement of the Clay proposal was 
firmly attached to the interstate system and the emphasis 
placed on building more highways to solve urban 
transportation and congestion problems. Although the Senate 
passed the Gore bill, it encountered trouble in the House of 
Representatives, where the highway lobby exercised its 
influence most effectively. Additional hearings dragged on 
through the spring and early summer of 1955.6
Meanwhile, Representative George Fallon, a Maryland 
Democrat who had supported road legislation throughout his 
tenure in Congress, submitted an alternate bill. Fallon's 
proposal garnered much attention— and caused a great deal of 
confusion— because this bill also reacted against the Clay 
plan's financing strategy. Several highway lobby members 
found Fallon's plan disconcerting. Although his resolution 
would build the interstate highway system this lobby so 
desperately sought, the Fallon plan would also saddle them 
with $375 million per year in additional taxes. Therefore, 
the trucking associations, tire and independent oil dealers, 
and diesel manufacturers ultimately decided to mobilize 
against Fallon's initiative. Democratic supporters of
5Senator Gore's proposal is published in Congress,
Senate, Committee on Public Works, Federal Highway Act of 
1955, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 987-998.
^hite, "Where Are Those New Roads," 49.
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Fallon's bill called for fiscal responsibility, further 
illustrating the flip-flop in economic philosophy between 
the two parties. They argued that taxing truckers and tire 
and petroleum manufacturers placed part of the new highway 
system's financial burden on those who would benefit most 
from its construction.7 Many Democrats in Congress also 
asserted that Clay's proposal to set up a bond corporation 
was an effort to evade the government's legal debt limit. 
Democrats argued that "the huge $280 billion official 
national debt was about to spin off a satellite 'Corporate' 
debt into Space, perhaps followed by others, until we had a 
whole constellation of satellite debts whirling about the 
economy, all exerting an irresistible inflationary pull."8
According to Theodore White, Republicans answered these 
criticisms "as if the mantle of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
all the ghosts of the New Deal had descended on them:
Nothing great of creative is ever done unless one reasonably 
finances the present out of the future," they maintained.
The Eisenhower administration believed that if Congress 
followed Clay's recommendations and the federal government
7"Correspondence," Box 452, File 883 6-1, Record Group 
23 3, Considerations for a National Highway Program: A 
Summary of Problems , Programs and Points of View, details 
the additional taxes contained in the Fallon bill. Fallon's 
bill was submitted to the House as H.R. 7 072, Congress, 
House, Committee on Public Works, Hearings, National Highway 
Program, Part 2, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 19 55, 1097-
1100.
Quotation from White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 48.
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built the new highways immediately with borrowed funds, 
highway use would rapidly increase and the additional 
gasoline taxes generated would more than cover construction 
expenses.9
This peculiar exchange of fiscal ideology between the 
two parties puzzled railroad leaders as they attempted to 
decide whether they would favor or oppose the Fallon bill. 
Legislation following Clay's financing methods would provide 
the trucking industry with a brand-new, federally-financed 
interstate highway system. Such vast improvement to the 
country's road network would mean truckers could enhance the 
quality and speed of their service without spending a dime. 
These improvements would also help strip the rails of their 
long-haul freight business. The railways had already seen 
the airlines take away their long-haul passengers and 
automobiles decimate their short-trip commuter business. 
Essentially, then, railroad leaders viewed any highway bill 
that followed the Clay financing plan as the final nail in 
their coffin.10
As the railroad industry formulated a strategy toward 
highway legislation, blatant resistance to highway expansion 
appeared unfeasible. Railroad executives knew that the 
general public favored expanding and improving the nation's
9Ibid., 48.
10Ibid. , 50.
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road network. The railroads concluded that they had to 
sanction highway construction. Otherwise, the highway lobby 
would portray the railroads as an obstacle to national 
progress and security and, in the process, become a 
scapegoat for the highway program's failure. This decided, 
railroad leaders sought to display public support for 
highway expansion without jeopardizing their industry's 
existence. The Fallon bill fit perfectly into their 
strategy. Fallon's proposal balanced trucking industry 
gains made through highway expansion and improvement with 
losses incurred through addition taxation. These losses 
would drive trucking rates skyward and create a more level 
playing field for competition between the trucking and 
railroad industries. Or so railroad leaders hoped.
American Railroad Association Vice-President Robert S. 
Henry explained the railroads' position in this way:
Highways? Why of course we're in favor of good 
highways. But we want a sound highway program and any 
sound highway program has to include user charges—  
people who benefit from it should pay, and that's 
particularly true of people who use these facilities to 
carry on commercial business. We railways pay in taxes 
11.9 cents of every dollar we take in; we pay 19.7 
cents more of every dollar to maintain our roadbeds and 
tracks. The truckers pay only 7 cents of their dollar 
for taxes and they get their roadbeds free. . . .
That's just not fair— and that's why we think the 
Fallon bill is such a good bill.11
Many within the trucking industry did not agree with
Henry's position. John Lawrence, the American Trucking
nIbid., 50.
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Association's managing director, compared railroad advocates 
to locusts when he asserted that "No such railroad lobby has 
descended on Washington in the history of the Republic as 
that which is now operating in support of the soak-the- 
trucks proposals. It is this wrecking crew which is mainly 
responsible for throwing the highway situation out of 
perspective.1,12
This was not the first time that truckers and railroad 
owners had disagreed. Antagonism between the two industries 
increased as truckers took a larger and larger share of 
railroad business. In 192 6, railroads carried almost 77 
percent of intercity ton-miles. By 1956, the rails' share 
had fallen to 49 percent while their share of gross revenues 
fell from 87 to 34 percent. On the other hand, trucks 
carried fourteen times their 1926 ton-miles, nearly one- 
fifth of all ton-miles produced in 1956.13
Twenty-five years after cementing its relationship with 
the federal government, the railroad industry found itself 
trying to convince Congress that another industry would 
unfairly benefit from federal assistance. Many railroad 
advocates claimed that trucks did not face the same degree
12Ibid. , 52.
13Congress, Senate, "Manuscript of Report of the 
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce" Box 13 File 85A-F10, Record 
Group 46, Problems of the Railroads, National Archives, 
Washington, D. C.; Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958, 
10- 11.
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of government regulation as the railroads and, as a result, 
could charge lower rates. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission had extended its regulating powers to the 
trucking industry in 1933, but the regulation enacted was 
generally lenient. Contract and common carriers— those 
contracted to carry individual shippers' freight and those 
who hauled general freight, such as moving vans and 
automobile carriers— were subject to the ICC's authority.
The ICC required contract carriers to obtain an operating 
permit and report a schedule of minimum charges but did not 
demand a list of specific fees. The ICC set common 
carriers' fees and routes and, therefore, these carriers 
faced more stringent regulation. Private carriers— those 
who owned trucks for transporting their own products— were 
exempt from all ICC control except safety regulations. In 
1952, there were twice as many exempt carriers as contract 
and common carriers combined.14
Railroad leaders hoped to emphasize this relative lack 
of regulation when promoting Representative Fallon's bill. 
But the trucking industry, along with diesel manufacturers, 
and the big oil and tire companies launched a massive 
lobbying effort aimed at defeating the bill. These 
interests argued that singling out their industries for
14|lWhere Do Trucks Go from Here?" Business Week,, 
November 22, 1952, 72-73; Hilton, The Transportation Act of 
1958, 7-9.
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additional taxation was unfair and painted a dark picture of 
a tax-crippled diesel industry unable to provide sufficient 
fuel for the diesel-powered military. An avalanche of 
telegrams hit Congress during the early summer of 1955.
Small businesspeople described the harm additional taxes 
would have on their economic well-being. David Beck, 
president of the Teamster's Union and member of the Clay 
Advisory Committee, mobilized his union to defeat the Fallon 
bill. House members received telegrams from truckers who 
stopped on their routes three and four times a day to send 
telegrams expressing opposition to the Fallon bill while 
Beck made a personal call on Senator Sam Rayburn to 
emphasize the teamsters' point of view. In turn, the 
railroads realized that they no longer held Congress's 
undivided attention on transportation issues. Average 
motorists, who would save $100 per year in car expenses 
under the Fallon proposal, were strangely silent during 
congressional debates.15 Their lack of interest in Fallon's 
plan, coupled with the vigorous action of the multi-faceted 
opposition lobby, proved too much for the railroads. On 
July 27, 1955, the House of Representatives defeated the 
Fallon bill by a 292 to 123 margin.16
15White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 51.
16Congress, House, National Interstate Highway Act, 84th 
Congress, 1st session, H. R. 7072, Congressional Record, 
vol. 101, no. 9, daily ed. (July 27, 1955), S11717-18.
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The Fallon bill's defeat, however, did not end debate 
on the interstate highway program. Walter Belson of the 
American Trucking Association revealed his organization's 
perspective when he stated:
Yes, we [the trucking association] had 
considerable influence in killing the Fallon bill. But don't 
confuse the Fallon bill with the highway program. We're not 
such stupid idiots as to be opposed to a road program we 
need as much as anyone else. We were the first group to 
support the highway program from the beginning . . . we
agreed to accept increased taxes to pay for it— we'll pay 
our fair share, the same rate on fuel, tires, and equipment 
everyone else pays.17
When Congress reconvened in the fall of 1955, the 
interstate highway program still had numerous supporters 
willing to work toward a compromise. William Noorlag, Jr., 
general manager of the Central Motor Freight Association, 
expressed his industry's frustration with the railroads' 
attempts to make truckers fight highway legislation.
Noorlag believed that the railroads wanted truckers to 
oppose the highway program "so that truckers would be blamed 
for killing the highway measure which the scheming railroads 
had set out to do by hook or crook." But he was also 
optimistic that "the Senate committees [could] restore 
equity and reality to the tax increase measure."18
Eventually, Fallon and Representative Hale Boggs of 
Louisiana fashioned a bill that conformed to Belson and
17White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 50.
18Quotations from Noorlag appear in Rose, Interstate,
85.
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Noorlag's prerequisites. The bill did not change the 
highway program's original purpose as outlined by the Clay 
committee. The interstate highway system was the measure's 
centerpiece and this proposal also provided funds for 
construction without asking significant sacrifices from any 
highway lobby members. The new bill cut the Fallon plan's 
taxes on gasoline and diesel in half; Fallon and Boggs 
reduced the tax increase on rubber from 10 to 15 cents per 
pound to 3 cents; they included a 2 percent hike in the 
excise tax on new trucks, trailers, and buses, and trucking 
interests accepted a $1.50 per thousand pounds surcharge on 
the total weight of trucks heavier than thirteen tons.19 
The last provision gained acceptance because in 1952, just 
10 percent of all trucks on the road weighed as much as nine 
tons. Thus, the last additional tax would not affect the 
vast majority of the nation's truckers.20
Like the Clay committee's proposal, the Fallon-Boggs 
bill also stipulated that the federal government would pay 
90 percent of the new interstate system's construction 
costs. The government would also distribute $25 billion 
according to local needs, but correcting urban congestion 
problems would cost the most money and, therefore, would
19See "Federal Highway Act of 1956," (Public Law 627, 
June 29, 1956) 70 United States Statues at Large, 374-402
hereafter cited as the "Federal Highway Act of 19 56" for 
complete contents of the law.
20"Where Do Trucks Go From Here?" 74.
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receive a disproportionate share of the funds. Those who 
championed highway construction over mass transit to solve 
urban traffic problems had succeeded.21
Boggs and Fallon also pleased the Bureau of Public 
Roads and others who opposed both the federal and various 
state governments' tendency to collect more in highway- 
related taxes than they spent on roads. The Highway Trust 
fund provision of the new bill rectified this problem. All 
money collected from fuel, tire, new vehicle, and surcharge 
taxes would be deposited into this fund for road building 
and maintenance alone.22
During June 1956, the Fallon-Boggs proposal sailed 
through Congress. The bill passed by an eighty-nine to one 
margin in the Senate; the House of Representatives held a 
voice vote on the measure and did not bother to record its 
final tally. On July 29, President Eisenhower signed the 
Federal Highway Act into law.23
The package's final version was almost a carbon copy of 
the Clay committee's proposal. Congress even acknowledged
21See "Federal Highway Act of 1956 - Title II, Highway 
Revenue Act of 1956," United States Statues At Large, 70, 
387-402 for complete financing arrangements.
22Ibid.
23Congress, House, Federal Highway Act of 1956, 84th 
Congress, 2d Session, H. R. 10660, Congressional Record, 
vol. 102, no. 8, daily ed. (June 26, 1956), S10969, H11004.
When Congress calls for a voice vote on a bill and does not 
record the final tally, it can generally be assumed that the 
bill in question had overwhelming support.
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the perceived importance of the highway program's civil and 
national defense features. The Federal Highway Act of 1956 
stipulated that "because of its primary importance to the 
national defense, the name of [the interstate system] is 
hereby changed to the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways."24
After recovering from a heart attack, President 
Eisenhower played a key role in winning the highway bill's 
approval. In 1954, he had appointed the Clay committee, 
thus making highway improvement an issue. Two years later, 
the Eisenhower administration and Congress compromised with 
trucking interests on additional taxation, believing that 
building the interstate system would help create both short- 
and long-term economic prosperity. The thousands of 
construction jobs generated would achieve the former, while 
providing both the motorist and trucker with a quicker, 
safer means of reaching their vacation sites and delivery 
destinations would accomplish the later objective.25 
Eisenhower was jubilant when informed of the bill's passage. 
He spoke of the great step taken to improve the nation's 
transportation system. The president also took pleasure in 
describing the enormous construction project necessary to
24"Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956," United States 
Statues at Large, 70, 3 78.
25For a discussion of Eisenhower's involvement in 
gaining the bill final approval, see Rose, Interstate, 85- 
95.
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build the interstate highway system. He declared that "the 
amount of concrete poured to form these roadways would build 
eighty Hoover Dams or six sidewalks to the moon."26
Others, however, were not so enthusiastic. City 
planner and author Lewis Mumford's appraisal of the 
interstate program went as follows: "the most charitable 
thing to assume about this action is that they [Congress and 
the administration] hadn't the faintest notion of what 
they were doing." Mumford was also prophetic when he wrote 
that "by the time they find out it will be too late to 
correct all the damage to our cities and countryside done 
by . . . this ill-conceived and preposterously unbalanced
program.1,27
In The Nation, David Cort outlined how "a single bus or 
train takes between twenty and one thousand cars off the 
roads." Cort advocated more spending on buses and railways 
but he saw urban traffic as so overwhelming that drastic 
measures were needed. He argued that "The privilege of 
driving a car must be made immensely more honorable and 
exclusive. License examinations must be rigorous." Cort 
also called for license suspensions "at the first indication 
of driving incompetence and that the suspension period ought 
to be in terms of years, not weeks." Cort went on to
26Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 548.
27Lewis Mumford, The Highway and the City (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1956), 234.
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conclude that "the automobile had converted the descendants 
of the American pioneers, the toughest most energetic and 
open-minded people in the civilized world, into lazy, fat- 
seated invalids."28
These objections, though, were out of touch with the 
administration's perception, which saw the new highways as a 
progressive measure to solve transit problems. Implicit in 
Eisenhower's reasoning was his administration's realization 
that the future of commercial freight transportation was in 
the trucking, not the railroad industry. Fifty years 
earlier, railroads successfully gained federal regulation of 
their industry not because of progressive hostility toward 
monopolistic business practices, but because Congress and 
three presidents from both political parties realized that 
economic prosperity depended on the railroads' stability.
By 1956, however, railroads were no longer essential to 
American economic success. Regulation and the trend toward 
automotive transportation damaged the industry to the point 
where its opinions and needs no longer carried much weight 
with Congress or the Eisenhower administration. Both 
branches of government simply believed that the country's 
long-term interests would be better served by accommodating 
the wishes of the diesel, oil, and, especially, the trucking 
industries over those of the railroads. The dynamics of the
28David Cort, "Our Strangled Highways," The Nation,. 182 
(April 28, 1956), 360.
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relationship between business and government had not changed 
in fifty years; government was still willing to consider 
business concerns before worrying about the welfare of any 
other segment of society. In 1956, the triumvirate of 
diesel, oil, and trucking represented America's economic 
future. These industries used their influence to defeat a 
bill that would have produced an interstate system at an 
unacceptable price. When the dust cleared after the Fallon 
bill's defeat, these three industries created enough support 
to pass a highway bill on their terms. In 1956, business 
interests were still of paramount concern to the federal 
government when formulating transportation policy, but the 
businesses involved had changed.
CONCLUSION
Business interests did triumph over opponents of the 
interstate highway system. The trucking industry's victory 
demonstrated the strength of the relationship that had 
developed between business and government during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the 1950s, 
the trucking industry and its allies were willing to ask for 
government assistance and allow government interference 
within an economic system that supposedly championed free 
enterprise. At the turn of the century, the railroads had 
been willing to ask for the same things. Moreover, the 
federal government expressed an interest in guarding the 
interests of key industries throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century.
Recognizing this long-term relationship between 
business and government suggests an alternative way of 
periodizing modern American history. Historians of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have divided this time 
period into small, neatly partitioned sections based largely 
upon major political and economic events and trends. 
Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, World 
War I, the Roaring 192 0s, the Great Depression, and World 
War II constitute the standard pre-1945 periodization. The
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post-war years are usually divided by decade or presidential 
administration, with the Second World War acting as a great 
divide that separates the post-war era from all that 
preceded it.1
These five- and ten-year periods encourage historians 
to focus their research on one of these extremely small 
segments. The resultant scholarship, therefore, has 
reinforced and strengthened the standard periodization, but 
this method of dividing the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries has also created serious problems. First and 
foremost among these problems is the lack of unifying trends 
and themes that cover significant portions of this time 
period. The challenge, then, is to construct interpretive 
frameworks that attempt to identify and understand long-term 
change and continuity.2
The development of the relationship between business
William Chafe's work emphasizes the importance of 
World War II in transforming American society. See William 
H. Chafe, The Paradox of Change: American Women in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 
and Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War 
II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2Some historians of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries have moved beyond the limitations created by the 
standard periodization. These works have focused on a 
variety of topics. See, for instance, Emily Rosenberg, 
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural 
Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982);
Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and 
the Reconstruction of Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987); George Chauncey, Gay New 
York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male 
World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
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and government during the first half of the twentieth 
century provides such a framework. The Second Industrial 
Revolution helped create big businesses like the railroads 
and also spawned high levels of competition within these 
industries. Industrial capitalism also helped plug farmers 
on the newly-settled Great Plains into the world market 
economy, but selling their produce on the national and 
international market had unforeseen consequences. Mid- 
Western farmers found themselves depending on banks and 
railroad companies that charged unreasonable interest rates 
and shipping fees. Dissatisfaction with these developments 
led to the Populist Revolt of the 1890s and the rural reform 
politics of the Progressive Era. Mid-Western farmers and 
other shippers turned to the government for assistance in 
establishing equitable business relationships with the 
nations' railroads. Some railroads, however, sought to turn 
reform efforts in their favor by supporting regulation that 
helped eliminate the competition that had made the railroad 
industry so unstable during the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century. Both Congress and the Progressive Era's 
presidents knew that the locomotive was an essential part of 
American economic success. Punishing railroad companies 
with regulation designed solely for the benefit of farmers 
and other shippers would jeopardize future economic security 
and prosperity. Thus, the biggest, strongest railroads 
largely succeeded in establishing a body of federal
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regulatory law that helped stabilize the industry while 
significantly increasing profits.
The Progressive Era established a relationship between 
transportation interests and government that remained in 
place during the following decades. This relationship 
changed, however, as other methods of transportation 
developed. Regulation had stabilized the railroad industry, 
but it also made railroad companies unresponsive to 
competition. This inflexibility enabled the trucking 
industry to strip the railroads of larger and larger 
portions of their freight-hauling business between 1920 and 
1940.
At the same time, state and federal highway officials 
exercised increasing influence over road construction 
policy. The Bureau of Public Roads along with many state 
highway departments lobbied successfully for more highway 
construction. The automobile's popularity helped marshall 
support for road construction, but a new lobby composed of 
businesses related to highway travel also increasingly 
influenced the federal government's transportation policies.
During the decade following World War II, the trucking 
and automobile industries usurped the railroads from their 
primary position in providing transportation. As a result, 
the railroads lost their distinction as a vital force in the 
American economy, and thus lost a great deal of their 
influence in the halls of Congress and the executive branch.
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As during the Progressive Era, the federal government wished 
to promote the interests of vital businesses. Building the 
interstate highway system was a way of doing just that for 
the industries that had taken over American transportation.
Looking at the rise of automotive transportation over a 
seventy-five year period produces a fuller understanding of 
the relationship between business and government and how it 
helped produce the railroads' decline while promoting the 
simultaneous ascent of the truck and automobile. This 
interpretive framework also charts a new period in modern 
America history that might be called the Rise of the 
Corporate State. By connecting the Progressive Era to the 
immediate post-World War II years to reveal both continuity 
and change, this new period also rejects the standard 
periodization's tendency to view the post-war era as 
fundamentally different from the decades leading up to the 
Second World War.
This thesis concentrates mainly on the political 
developments that produced the interstate highway system and 
a transportation network dependent on the automobile, but 
other topics related to these issues would also re-orient 
twentieth-century periodization. For instance, automobiles 
became a class signifier for middle- and upper-class 
Americans during the first half of the twentieth century. 
These Americans gained the economic wherewithal to provide 
their own transportation while the poorer, mostly immigrant
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and black residents of the inner city continued to rely on 
public transportation. Hence, automobiles became a vehicle 
for class separation and the interstate highway system could 
be viewed as a project that strengthened those class 
barriers.
Automobile ownership could also be seen as a method of 
indicating class membership. In the increasingly mobile 
world of twentieth-century America, it became more difficult 
to demonstrate economic and social status. How could people 
effectively display class affiliation when they traveled to 
distant places populated by strangers? The make and model 
of one's automobile became an important indicator of the 
owner's economic status. The automobile, which helped 
create a more mobile society and, in turn, created the 
problem of indicating class status, also helped solve that 
problem by clearly exhibiting the owner's economic class.
This view of the automobile's popularity among middle- 
and upper-class Americans moves beyond the twentieth 
century's standard periodization to encompass the entire 
period between approximately 1900 and 1960. This new period 
might be called the Making of a Middle-Class Identity. 
Attaching the display of class status to automobile 
ownership and the automobile's popularity links the general 
economic prosperity of the early twentieth century with the 
post-World War II economic boom that significantly expanded 
the country's middle-class population. This approach
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reveals that the massive production and acquisition of 
consumer goods after World War II had its roots in the 
development of a consumer culture during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. In other words, the twenty 
years centering on 1900 produced a consumer mentality that 
helped create the economic boom following World War II.3
These are only a few examples of how to apply 
interpretive frameworks that re-periodize the post-civil War 
era. Developing a new periodization will require historians 
to think broadly about their topics, and, in the process, 
pay stricter attention to determining the origins of events 
and problems. Thinking broadly means putting aside the 
major political and economic events that historians have
30n the development of consumer culture, see David 
Potter, People of Plenty: Abundance and the American 
Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); T.
J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the 
Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1981); Richard Wightman Fox and T. J.
Jackson Lears, eds., The Culture of Consumption: Critical
Essays in American History, 1880-1980 (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1983); Simon J. Bronner, ed.,
Consuming Visions: Accumulation and Display of Goods in 
America, 1880-1920 (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1989).
Some historians argue that the rise of consumer culture can 
be traced back to mid-eighteenth century and earlier. See 
Cary Carson, "The Consumer Revolution in Colonial America: 
Why Demand?" in Cary Carson, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. 
Albert, eds., Of Consuming Interests: The Style of Life in 
the Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville, Virginia:
University of Virginia Press, 1994), 483-697.
On the post-World War II economic boom and middle-class 
expansion, see John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); Loren Baritz, The Good 
Life: The Meaning of Success for the American Middle Class 
(New York: Random House, 1982); Kenneth T. Jackson,
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used to demarcate the post-Civil War era. Twentieth century 
historical scholarship's concentration on political and 
economic history has kept the field from reaching its full 
potential. Students and scholars alike often complain that 
studies dealing with the twentieth century pale in 
comparison to the scholarship produced on the nineteenth 
century and the colonial period. What is so different about 
these earlier time periods? First, both have standard 
periodizations that are much looser than the twentieth 
century's. Historians divide the nineteenth century into 
three segments: The revolutionary era of the late eighteenth 
to early nineteenth centuries, the early republic, and the 
ante-bellum period. Different colonial historians organize 
colonial history in different ways while some deny that any 
type of standard periodization exists.
These approaches encourage colonial and nineteenth 
century historians to develop topics that cover wider 
expanses of time. Furthermore, scholars of these time 
periods are not bound by a periodization that consistently 
highlights political and economic events and trends. The 
result is that nineteenth century and colonial historians 
have stopped paying strict attention to political and 
economic history. This move toward social and cultural 
history reflects a trend that has been going on within the 
entire historical profession for the last twenty years. 
Indeed, the future of history lies in studying social and
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cultural interaction and development.
What is at stake, then, is the future of twentieth 
century history. It would be irresponsible to eliminate 
political history when studying a century where the power 
and influence of the state dramatically increased. The 
challenge is to move away from strict political and economic 
history and move toward incorporating social and cultural 
developments into twentieth-century historical scholarship. 
Such scholarship would address, for instance, how a society 
and culture increasingly influenced and shaped by state 
actions reacted to state control. These studies will also 
help move twentieth century historical scholarship into the 
twenty-first century.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
U.S. Government Documents:
All are published by the Government Printing Office in 
Washington, D. C.
Bureau of the Census
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times 
to 1957. Washington, 1960.
Congress, House
Message from the President of the United States, Highway
Needs for National Defense. 81st Congress, 1st Session, 
1949.
Committee on Public Works. Hearings Before Subcommittee on
Roads Concerning National Highway Study. 83rd Congress, 
1st Session, 1953.
Committee on Public Works. Hearings on Federal Highway Act 
of 1954. 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1954.
The President's Advisory Committee on a National Highway
Program. Hearings on a National Highway Program. 84th 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1954.
Committee on Public Works. Letter from Secretary of
Commerce. Needs of the Highway Systems, 1955-84. Report 
prepared by the Commissioner of Public Roads in 
cooperation with the several state highway departments. 
84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955.
Committee on Public Works. Hearings on H.R. 42 60: To Create 
a Federal Highway Corporation for Financing of 
Construction of the National System of interstate 
Highways. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955.
85
86
Committee on Public Works. Hearings, National Highway
Program, Part 2. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955.
The President's Advisory Committee on a National Highway 
Program. A 10-Year Highway Program: A Report to the 
President. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955.
Committee on Government Operation. Hearings on Civil Defense 
for National Survival. 84th Congress, 2d Session, 1956.
Subcommittee on Roads of the Committee on Public Works. 
Report on H.R. 8836: National Highway Program - 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. 84th Congress, 2d 
Session, 1956.
Committee on Public Roads. Report on Federal Highway and 
Highway Revenue Acts of 1956. 84th Congress, 2d 
Session, 1956.
Congress, Senate
Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works. Hearings on 
Bills Related to National Highway Program. 84th 
Congress, 1st Session, 1955.
Committee on Public Works. Federal Highway Act of 1955. 84th 
Congress, 1st Session, 1955.
Committee on Finance. Hearings on H.R. 10660: Highway
Revenue Act of 1956. 84th Congress, 2d Session, 1956.
Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Problems of 
the Railroads, Part 1, 85th Congress, 2d Session, 1958.
Department of Commerce
Bureau of Public Roads. Highways in the United States. 1954.
Bureau of Public Roads. Highway Statistics: Summary to 1955. 
1957.
Interstate Commerce Commission
Statistics of Railroads in the United States, 1900-1920, 21 
vols., 1902-1923.
Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, 107 vols. 1887-
87
Public Laws
"An Act To Further Regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations
and Among the States" Public Law 104. February 19, 1903 
32 United States Statues at Large: 847-849.
"An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 'An Act To Regulate
Commerce Approved February 4, 1887 . . . "  Public Law 
3 37. June 29, 1906. 34 United States Statutes at Large: 
584-595.
"An Act To Create a Commerce Court . . . "  Public Law 218.
June 28, 1910. 36 United States Statues at Large: 539- 
557.
"Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956," (Public Law 627, June 29, 
1956), 70 United States Statues at Large: 374-402.
Unpublished Government Documents
Congress, House. Committee on Public Works.
"Correspondence." Boxes 4 37-478, Record Group 233. 
Considerations for a National Highway Program: A 
Summary of Problems, Programs and Points of View. By 
William B. Allen, AFL-CIO. National Archives. 
Washington, D.C.
Congress, Senate. Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, 
Correspondence. Boxes 1-56, Record Group 46.
National Archives. Washington, D. C.
Congress, Senate. "Manuscript of Report of the Subcommittee 
on Surface Transportation of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce." Boxes 5-23, Record 
Group 46. Problems of the Railroads. National 
Archives. Washington, D.C.
Collections of Documents
Messages and Papers of the President, 1789-1904, 10 vols.
James Richardson, ed. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of 
National Literature and Art, 1905.
The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 6 vols. Ray Stannard 
Baten and William E. Dodd, eds. New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 192 6.
88
U. S. President. Public Papers of the President of the
United States. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal 
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1959. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955.
State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1790-1966, 2 
vols. Fred L. Israel, ed. New York: Chelsea House, 
1966.
United States Statues at Large, 105 vols. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1848-1873, Washington,D. C.: 1874-
Contemporary Books and Articles
Bartholomew, Harland. "Planning for Metro Transport."
Planning and Civic Comment 105 (September, 1954): 4.
Clay, Lucius. "A New National Highway Program." Virginia 
Municipal Review. 32 (January, 1955): 9-10.
Cort, David. "Our Strangled Highways." The Nation. 182 
(April 28, 1956): 357-60.
Labatut, Jean and Lane J. Wheaton. Highways in our National 
Life: A Symposium. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1950.
MacDonald, Thomas H. "The Case for Urban Expressways." 
American City 61 (November, 1946): 116-117.
Mumford, Lewis. The Highway and the City. New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1956.
"The U.S. Highway System." Fortune, June, 1941, 92-99, 106,
108, 111.
"Where Do Trucks Go from Here?" Business Week. November 22, 
1952, 70+.
White, Theodore H. "Where Are Those New Roads?" Collier's, 
January 6, 1956, 44-51.
Ylvisaker, Paul. "The Deserted City." Journal of American 
Institute of Planners 25 (February, 1959): 2-12.
Secondary Sources: Books and Articles
Branyan, Robert L. and Lawrence H. Larsen, eds. The
Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961: A Documentary 
History. New York: Random House, 1971.
89
Burgess, George H. and Miles C. Kennedy. Centennial History 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1846-1946. 
Philadelphia: 1949.
Carosso, Vincent P. The Morgans: Private International 
Bankers, 1854-1913. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1987.
Daggett, Stuart. Principles of Inland Transportation. New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1928.
Danielson, Michael N. Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the 
Commuter Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1965.
Davies, Richard 0. The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the 
Freeway, and the Condition of Metropolitan America. 
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1975.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandate for
Change, 1953-1956. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 19 63.
FIink, James J. The Car Culture. Cambridge, Mass.:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 197 5.
_______________ . The Automobile Age. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 1988.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1958.
Gould, Lewis L. The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. 
Lawrence, Kansas: University Kansas Press, 1991.
Hilton, George. The Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of 
Experience. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1969.
Himmelberg, Robert F. ed. The Rise of Big Business and the
Beginnings of Antitrust and Railroad Regulation. Vol. 1 
of Business and Government in America Since 1870. New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994.
 __________ , ed. The Monopoly Issue and Antitrust,
1900-1917. Vol. 2 of Business and Government in America 
Since 1870. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994.
90
_______________, ed. Growth of the Regulatory State, 1990-
1917: State Federal Regulation of Railroads and Other 
Enterprises. Vol. 3 of Business and Government in 
America Since 1870. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 
1994.
Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to 
F. D. R. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.
 _____________, ed. The Progressive Movement, 1900-1915.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1963.
Hoogenboom, Ari and Olive. History of the ICC: From Panacea 
to Palliative. New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
Inc., 1976.
Jackson, Kenneth T. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization 
of the United States. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985.
Keeler, Theodore E. Railroads, Freight, and Public Policy. 
Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983.
Keller, Morton. Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and 
Economic Change in America, 1900-1913. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990.
____________ , ed. Regulating a New Society: Public Policy
and Social Change in America, 1900-1933. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994.
Kolko, Gabriel. The Triumph of Conservatism: A
Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916. New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1963.
________ . Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1965.
Lears, T. J. Jackson. No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and 
the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1981.
Leavitt, Helen. Superhighway-Superhoax. Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday and Company, 197 0.
Leonard, William Norris. Railroad Consolidation Under the 
Transportation Act of 1920. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1946.
91
Leuchtenburg, William. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal, 1932-1940. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 
1963 .
MacAvoy, Paul W. The Economic Effects of Regulation: The
Trunk Line Railroad Cartels and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Before 1900. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965.
Martin, Albro. Railroads Triumphant: The Growth, Rejection, 
and Rebirth of a Vital American Force. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992.
Mowbray, A. Q. Road to Ruin. (Philadelphia: Lippincott,
Inc., 1969).
Nelson, James C. Railroad Transportation and Public Policy. 
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1959.
Rae, John B. The American Automobile: A Brief History. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 65.
___________ . The Road and the Car in American Life.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1971.
Reynolds, George G. The Distribution of Power to Regulate 
Interstate Carriers Between Nations and States. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1928.
Rose, Mark H. Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939- 
1989, revised edition. Knoxville, Tennessee: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1990.
Seely, Bruce E. Building the American Highway System: 
Engineers as Policymakers. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1987.
Sharfman, I. L. The Interstate Commerce Commission, 5 vols. 
New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931-19 37.
Smith, Jean Edward, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life. New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 199 0.
White, Theodore H. Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard 
Nixon. New York: Atheneum Publishers, 197 5.
Wickman, John. "Ike and the Great Truck Train." Kansas 
History 13 (Autumn, 1990): 139-48.
92
Wiebe, Robert H. Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the 
American Progressive Movement, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.
______________The Search for Order, 1877-1920. New York:
Hill and Wang, 1967.
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and 
Power. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.
VITA
Anthony Roland DeStefanis
Born in Providence, Rhode Island, June 7th, 1969. 
Graduated from North Providence High School in June 1987. 
Bachelor of Arts, Rhode Island College in History and 
Political Science, May 1992. Entered the College of William 
and Mary in 1993 as an Editorial Assistant at the Institute 
of Early American History and Culture. In August 1994, the 
author entered the Ph.D. program in History at William and 
Mary.
